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1. Introduction  
1.1. Research field and motivation 
Information asymmetry between lender and borrower is a main problem in debt 
contracting. Its consequences are adverse selection and moral hazard. On the one hand, 
adverse selection is the problem that lenders face firms of unknown quality. On the other 
hand, moral hazard arises since firms’ managers’ intention and performance is 
unpredictable. 1  Therefore, lenders use different information sources to decrease 
information asymmetry and overcome the mentioned problems (e.g., Berger and Udell 
2006; Cassar et al. 2015; Danos et al. 1989). Two main sources are private information 
(soft factors) and accounting information (hard factors).2 A central research question is 
how these different information sources interact with each other in reducing information 
asymmetry (Beyer et al. 2010). Recent research addresses this question and leads to 
contrary results. The results of Kano et al. (2011) indicate that audited statements and 
relationship duration complement each other. Contrary, Cassar et al. (2015) show that the 
use of accrual accounting (instead of cash accounting) and the duration of a relationship 
substitute each other in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, Bharath et al. 
(2011) illustrate in their study that firms with low accounting quality get more benefits of 
relationship lending. The mentioned studies do not only have contradicting results, but 
the latter study is also an examination of public firms in a market-based environment 
where lenders rely mostly on financial statements. Hence, it is interesting to shed light on 
the contradicting results and examine the mentioned research question in a bank-based 
environment where lenders mostly rely on relationship lending (Ball and Shivakumar 
2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006).  
Until now, European research examined the influence of private and accounting 
information on debt contracting separately. The accounting research shows that better 
accounting quality leads to higher access to bank debt (García-Teruel et al. 2014) and to 
lower cost of debt (Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015) for small and medium private firms. 
                                                 
1 For a detailed explanation, see e.g. Scott (2012). 
2 See Berger and Udell (2006) for explanation of soft and hard information factors. 
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However, debt contracting is traditionally based on relationship lending for 
aforementioned firms in a bank-based environment (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006). Therefore, the first part of this doctoral thesis tries to fill this gap 
and answers the question how relationship lending affects the influence of accounting 
quality in reducing information asymmetry in a bank-based environment. Using different 
measures for relationship lending, we find that accounting and private information, 
substitute as well as complement each other. Accordingly, the first part of this doctoral 
thesis demonstrates that it is difficult to disentangle the particular role of each information 
source for existing borrowers. Thus, inspired by Danos et al. (1989), who state that 
accounting information is particularly valuable in evaluating new borrowers, we analyze 
in the second part of this doctoral thesis if mandatory publication of accounting 
information leads to lower information asymmetry in the form of firms’ higher access to 
bank debt. In particular, we use the fact, that information asymmetry exists between 
different parties. The first considered is the already mentioned information asymmetry 
between inside lender (i.e. housebank) and the private firm, which is reduced through 
private and accounting information. The inside lender already has granted loans and is 
continuously monitoring and screening the existing borrower. The second possible 
information asymmetry is between outside (i.e. potential) lender and private firm. In 
particular, the outside lender has the goal to establish a debt contract with the private firm 
as a potential new borrower. The third conceivable information asymmetry is between 
inside and outside lender. Thus, the outside lender has an informational disadvantage 
compared to the potential borrower as well as compared to the inside lender. The outside 
lender could reduce the mentioned information asymmetry with publicly available 
accounting information (Ball et al. 2008; Kim, Simunic et al. 2011). The regulatory 
environment in Germany gives the possibility to simulate the information asymmetry 
between the mentioned parties. A regulatory change, where private firms have to make 
their accounting information publicly available, allows examining, if accounting 
information decreases information asymmetry between the previously discussed parties. 
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1.2. Research questions, results, and contributions 
This doctoral thesis is based on studies examined using datasets of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. In the following, we summarize the research questions, results, and 
contribution of each study.  
In the first study “Does accruals quality matter for German private firms’ cost of 
debt? The role of relationship lending” we examine how relationship lending influences 
the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt. A standard assumption in valuation is that 
investors evaluate securities based on expected future cash flows. The accounting 
literature proposes that accruals quality reflects the information uncertainty of cash flows. 
If firms have low accruals quality, then investors should anticipate higher information 
risk and should require higher cost of debt (Francis et al. 2005). Several studies find that 
firms with better accruals quality get lower lending rates for debt issuances (Bharath et 
al. 2008; Francis et al. 2005; Karjalainen 2011; Vander Bauwhede 2007). However, in 
Germany there is a bank-based financial system, where banks rely more on private 
information than on financial statements (Burgstahler et al. 2006). Therefore, this study 
tries to answer the questions, if accruals quality has an effect on cost of debt and how 
relationship lending changes this effect.  
In this study, we use two unique databases from Deutsche Bundesbank, the credit 
register of large loans (MiMiK) and the firms’ annual financial statement data (USTAN). 
Our final sample includes 10,024 observations for 2,159 small and medium sized firms 
during 2002 to 2008. We initially exhibit that banks require lower cost of debt from firms 
with better accruals quality. This indicates that better accruals quality helps banks to 
better assess firm risk. We then document that firms with better accruals quality get a 
lower reduction in the cost of debt the larger the amount they borrow from the main bank. 
This suggests that banks complement accounting information with additional private 
information channels if the loan amount warrants more scrutiny. Finally, we find that 
better accruals quality firms get a larger reduction in cost of debt the longer their relation 
to the same main bank. An explanation could be that repeated interactions with the same 
firm lead banks to interpret accounting information better. This study makes two 
contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine how 
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relationship strength mitigates the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt for a sample 
of German private small and medium enterprises. Second, we show that relationship 
duration increases the effect of accruals quality. 
The second study “What happens if private accounting information becomes 
public?” analyzes the effect of mandatory public disclosure on firms’ access to bank debt. 
The housebank can monitor the firm more effectively than an outside lender, as it has 
access to its financial statements and additional private information. Housebanks aim to 
be the firm’s exclusive lender (Diamond 1984) and have an incentive that firms cover up 
their financial statements (Bigus and Hillebrand 2016). Furthermore, also proprietary 
costs of public disclosure (Bernard et al. 2015) can result in firms' sharing financial 
statements only with their house banks. However, from 2006 on, German private firms 
have to publicize their financial statements in the online federal gazette. Therefore, we 
analyze if this mandatory publication leads to benefits for firms. Do outside lenders use 
these publicly available financial statements to assess firms’ quality and offer (additional) 
bank debt? 
In this empirical analysis, we use USTAN of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the 
commercial dataset Amadeus of Bureau van Dijk, propensity score matching and a 
difference-in-difference design. The final sample includes 48,623 firm-year observations 
from 2004 to 2009. Employing the act about electronic trade registers and cooperative 
registers as well as the company register (EHUG), which increased enforcement and first 
established fines for firms that do not publicly disclose their financial statements, at first 
glance surprising, we hypothesize and find that the information asymmetry between 
inside and outside lenders decreases, and firms’ access to bank debt increases. 
Accordingly, our study shows that mandatory public disclosure results in increased 
competition between lenders. As such, it decreases hold-up problems for private firms. 
Thus, it indicates short-term positive effects of the EHUG regulation for debt contracting 
of small and medium private firms. Since we lack credit data, our results do not show 
whether the inside or outside lender grants additional debt. After accounting information 
becomes public, it is possible that inside lenders provide additional bank debt to fend of 
new lenders, or outside lenders make use of the decreased information asymmetry and 
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offer bank loans. Therefore, in an additional analysis, we examine the influence of 
mandatory publication on firms’ price and non-price credit terms (i.e. interest rate, 
maturity, and collateral). We hypothesize, that credit terms will improve (worsen) if they 
are granted by inside (outside) lenders. First, regarding the price credit term, it is possible 
that the inside lender already used its monopoly position and can offer lower interest rates 
(Boot and Thakor 1994), whereby the outside lender will probably ask for higher interest 
rates due to the “winner’s curse”3 (Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Thadden 2004). 
Second, concerning the non-price credit terms, the inside lender can use the established 
relationship to monitor the firm and does not need to impose shorter maturity and more 
collateral (worse credit terms) as a substitute for monitoring. Contrary, the outside lender 
will, due to the absence of relationship lending, use shorter maturity and more collateral 
to decrease adverse selection and moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Our results 
show that once private accounting information becomes public it leads to a deterioration 
of the interest rate and collateral and to an improvement of maturity. Since the credit 
terms worsen as well as enhance, we conclude that inside as well as outside lender grant 
additional debt following the EHUG enforcement. Results of this quasi-natural 
experiment, and our novel dataset in a non-voluntary private firm setting, contribute to 
the discussion revolving around the nexus between private and public information in debt 
contracting. Contrary to the first study of this thesis, where we use accruals quality as a 
measure for accounting information, mandatory accounting publication does not suffer of 
endogeneity problems. Thus, with this quasi-natural experimental setting we decrease 
self-selection problems connected to discretionary accounting disclosure choices (Cassar 
2011; Cassar et al. 2015; Minnis 2011).  
The remainder of this doctoral thesis consists of two main parts. Chapter 2 
examines the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt. Chapter 3 analyzes the influence 
of publicly available accounting information on firm’s access to bank debt and credit 
terms. Chapter 4 summarizes the main findings and gives direction for future research.  
                                                 
3 The winner’s curse comes from auctions with incomplete information where the winner overpays and is 
therefore “cursed” (Thaler 1988). Furthermore, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) show that the informed 
bidder has positive expected profits and the uninformed bidder has zero expected profits. Thus, in our 
context, the uninformed bidder is the outside lender that tries to compensate for the winner’s curse.  
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2.  Does accruals quality matter for German private firms’ cost of 
debt? The role of relationship lending 
In this chapter, we examine the role of accruals quality for German private firms’ cost of 
debt. The main idea is to proof if accruals quality matters for small and medium 
enterprises in a bank-based environment where strong relationship lending exists. We 
provide empirical evidence that accruals quality influences firms’ cost of debt even after 
interacting it with several relationship lending measures. The following analyses are 
conducted as part of the research project "The role of accruals quality for German firms’ 
cost of debt" in cooperation with Deutsche Bundesbank. The views expressed in this study 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Deutsche Bundesbank.4 
We have presented a previous version of this study at the EAA Annual Congress in 
Maastricht 2016.5 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 gives an introduction. Section 
2.2 provides a brief literature overview and the hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the cost 
of debt, relationship lending and accruals quality metrics and the model. Section 2.4 
explains the data. Section 2.5 illustrates the main results. Section 2.6 reports the results 
of robustness checks. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.1. Introduction 
Accounting quality clearly influences debt contracting of public firms in a capital market 
environment (Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2005). These firms lend more money 
from arm’s length investors, which use financial statements as the prime source to lower 
information asymmetry (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006), than from 
banks. Yet, the role of accounting quality for lenders of private firms in a bank-based 
environment is still questionable. Indeed, previous bank-based studies find that 
accounting quality influences debt contracting of private firms (Karjalainen 2011; Vander 
Bauwhede et al. 2015). However, they do not control for relationship lending, which 
                                                 
4 The data used in this study is not publicly available due to conﬁdentiality agreements with Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
5 The paper version of this study is co-authored with Carsten Homburg (University of Cologne), Julia Nasev 
(University of Cologne), and Stefan Goldbach (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
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should be the prime information source for lenders within these circumstances (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006). To address this issue, we investigate how 
accounting and private information interact in reducing information asymmetry of private 
firms in a bank-based system. 
We analyze a large sample of German private small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs)6 and use two unique databases from Deutsche Bundesbank, the credit register of 
large loans (MiMiK) and the firms’ annual financial statement data (USTAN). Our final 
sample includes 10,024 observations for 2,159 firms from 2002 to 2008. Our measure for 
accounting quality is accruals quality on the basis of firms’ financial statements estimated 
with the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model by McNichols (2002) as the rolling 
5-year window standard deviation of residuals. Furthermore, to approximate for 
relationship lending, we use two relationship intensity measures (Degryse and van 
Cayseele 2000; Kano et al. 2011; Stein 2015). The first measure, relationship strength, is 
defined as the fraction of loans from the main bank to total loans, since this proxy most 
probably best reflects banks’ incentives to monitor and to access private information 
(Diamond 1984). Thus, if the loan amount warrants more scrutiny, the main bank has 
incentives to acquire costly private information. The second measure, relationship 
duration, is defined as the number of subsequent years in which the main bank remains 
the same. It represents the bank’s learning process due to frequent interactions. Longer 
relationships should increase the bank’s competence to interpret accounting information 
properly. 
We find that higher accruals quality leads to lower cost of debt indicating that 
banks rely on accounting based lending. Furthermore, we exhibit that the larger the 
amount a firm borrows from the main bank (i.e. higher relationship strength) the smaller 
is the effect of accruals quality on the cost of debt, which is a signal of the use of an 
additional private information channel. Finally, the outcomes suggest that longer 
relationships with the main bank lead to an increase in the cost of debt benefit of accruals 
                                                 
6 According to the European Commission, a firm which has less than 250 staff headcount and either turnover 
less or equal to €50 million or total assets less or equal to €43 million is considered a SME. The European 
SME definition is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-
definition/index_en.htm, last access: 20/08/2017. 
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quality. A potential explanation for this observation is that the bank learns to better assess 
the accuracy of accounting information as the length of the relationship increases. 
Our study makes two contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to examine how relationship strength mitigates the effect of 
accruals quality on cost of debt for a sample of German private SMEs. Second, we show 
that relationship duration increases the effect of accruals quality. 
The studies of Bharath et al. (2011), Cassar et al. (2015), and Kano et al. (2011) 
are the most related papers to our analysis. First, Bharath et al. (2011) analyze how 
relationship benefits change according to information opacity7 using loans of listed US 
firms. Firms with higher information opacity have higher relationship benefits according 
to their estimates. Second, Cassar et al. (2015) examine the effect of a firm’s choice to 
use accrual accounting on cost of debt and if relationship duration as an alternative source 
of information complements or substitutes this effect. According to them, firms with 
longer relationships get less benefit from using accrual accounting. They use a sample of 
small businesses from the US with 855 firms for the year 2003. Finally, Kano et al. (2011) 
analyze how information verifiability (audit vs. no audit) influences the effect of 
relationship lending (relationship scope and relationship duration) and conclude that firms 
with no verified information are more locked in. Their sample consists of 1,775 SMEs in 
Japan for the year 2002. In line with Bharath et al. (2011), Cassar et al. (2015), and Kano 
et al. (2011) we show that a strong relationship moderates the effect of accruals quality 
for German private firms. Thus, if the bank is the main lender, it has incentives to acquire 
costly private information. In addition, we show that a longer relationship enhances the 
effect of accruals quality. A possible explanation is that the bank better interprets 
accounting information. As the relationship continues, the bank will gain a data history 
on accounting information and can generate additional knowledge. 
We contribute especially to the European research on the consequences of 
accruals quality and relationship lending. Previous European research focuses either 
exclusively on the influence of accruals quality (Karjalainen 2011; Vander Bauwhede et 
                                                 
7 Information opacity is approximated with discretionary accruals out of the modified Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model by McNichols (2002) and higher information opacity means lower accruals quality. 
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al. 2015) or on the impact of relationship lending on cost of debt (Angelini et al. 1998; 
D’Auria et al. 1999; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff 
and Körting 1998; Lehmann and Neuberger 2001; Machauer and Weber 1998; Stein 
2015), but it does not consider the joint effect. We address this concern and investigate 
the collective influence of accruals quality and relationship lending in debt pricing. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize, that the German environment is especially 
worthwhile for the analyses of accruals quality, relationship lending, and cost of debt 
since Germany exhibits a traditional bank-based financial system and German private 
firms strongly depend on bank debt (Allen and Gale 1995; Bigus et al. 2009; Francfort 
and Rudolph 1992). Furthermore, Germany is well known for its house banks with strong 
relationships to their borrowers (Elsas and Krahnen 2003). In addition, German private 
firms are subject to several mandatory publication rules8, which possibly lead to an 
increased importance of financial statements for lenders. 
2.2. Related literature and hypotheses 
We consider two possible sources to reduce lenders’ information risk9 and therefore to 
lower firms’ loan rate: on the one hand accounting based lending, which refers to the 
assessment of firms earnings quality, and on the other hand, relationship lending related 
to monitoring, accessing private information, and banks’ learning process. 
Since accruals quality is our proxy for earnings related information risk, we start 
with the explanation of the theoretical relationship between earnings related information 
risk and cost of debt. Moreover, we discuss empirical findings, which show that the 
importance of accounting information in debt contracting differs among market-based 
and bank-based systems and among private and public firms. Then, we argue that 
especially for privately held firms in bank-based financial systems, as in Germany, the 
                                                 
8 The mandatory disclosure for corporations is defined in 2003 in the German Commercial Code, Section 
325 (https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/hgb/__325.html, last access: 22/09/2016). Furthermore, the 
publication of financial statements is strongly regulated since the introduction of the EHUG (Act on 
Electronic Commercial Registers, Registers of Cooperatives and Business Registers) in 1.1.2007. From 
this moment on, firms had to pay monetary penalties if not publicizing their financial statements on time 
(http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%255B@attr_id=%
27bgbl106s2553.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl106s2553.pdf%27
%5D__1474545682099, last access: 22/09/2016.). 
9 Information risk is the probability that investors get poor quality information about the firm (Francis et al. 
2005). 
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analyses of the effect of accruals quality on the debt pricing should include relationship 
lending as an important alternative information source. Finally, we derive our hypothesis 
that relationship strength moderates the accruals quality effect on cost of debt. However, 
at the same time relationship duration enhances the effect of accruals quality on cost of 
debt.  
The theoretical link between the quality of accounting information and the cost of 
debt arises from information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers in debt markets 
(Easley and O'Hara 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia 2005). To determine interest rates on debt 
contracts lenders assess the borrower’s ability to repay debt (García-Teruel et al. 2014) 
by estimating the borrower’s future cash flows. Poor accounting quality reduces the 
precision with which lenders can predict those future cash flows. To compensate for this 
information risk, lenders charge higher interest rates (Leuz and Verrecchia 2005). Francis 
et al. (2005) propose accruals quality as a proxy for the quality of accounting information 
which is related to information risk. Accruals map earnings into cash flows such that a 
lower accruals quality reflects a poorer mapping and leads to higher information risk for 
the lender.  
The importance of accounting information for the lender depends on the 
underlying financial system and the firms being private or public. The literature 
differentiates between market-based and bank-based financial systems, which arise due 
to different developments of financial institutions, banking systems and legislation (see 
Allen and Gale 1995; Leuz et al. 2003, for a review). Allen and Gale (1995) characterize 
US and Germany as two extreme versions of financial systems. In the US, a market-based 
system, financial markets play the dominant role. Firms mostly incur debt from arm’s-
length lenders, who make decisions primarily based on financial statements. In contrast, 
Germany is a bank-based system, where financial markets play a weaker role in 
refinancing operations. Firms borrow money primarily from banks, which rely mostly on 
private information rather than on firms’ financial statements (Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
Consequently, accounting information seems to be less important for lenders in bank-
based than in market-based systems. Furthermore, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) show that 
the importance of financial statements in debt contracting differs between private and 
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public firms. The results suggest that lenders of private firms get more “inside access” to 
information through relationship lending and do not demand high quality accounting. In 
contrast, lenders of public firms reduce information asymmetry problems through 
financial statements. To sum up, the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt should be 
the smallest for privately held firms in bank-based financial systems as it is the case in 
our setting of German private firms.  
The empirical evidence in market-based and bank-based financial systems 
supports the theoretical link between the quality of financial information and the 
perception of lenders’ information risk. First, prior studies in market-based financial 
systems find that higher accruals quality is associated with lower cost of debt (Francis et 
al. 2005), longer maturity, and lower collateral requirements (Bharath et al. 2008). This 
is consistent with the notion that creditors in market-based systems rely on financial 
statements to infer accounting quality and information risk. Second, recent empirical 
research for privately held firms in bank-based systems indicates that higher accruals 
quality entails lower cost of debt (Karjalainen 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015) and 
better access to bank loans (García-Teruel et al. 2014). However, keeping in mind that 
especially lenders of private firms in bank-based system rely mostly on relationship 
lending, the effects of accruals quality could be estimated incorrectly. Thus, neglecting 
the influence of relationship lending in reducing information asymmetry between lender 
and borrower leads to an omitted variable bias and consequently to improper inferences 
about the role of accruals quality.  
Therefore, we investigate how relationship lending influences the effect of 
accruals quality on cost of debt. Previous studies use different relationship intensity 
measures (for a detailed overview, see Degryse et al. 2009). To capture two aspects of 
relationship lending, we simultaneously use two relationship intensity measures: 
relationship strength and relationship duration (Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Kano et 
al. 2011; Stein 2015). 
The first hypothesis relates to the influence of relationship strength on the effect 
of accruals quality on firms’ loan rate. Relationship strength measures the amount the 
firm borrows from the main bank in relation to its overall debt. Previous theoretical and 
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empirical research shows that high relationship strength enhances lenders’ monitoring 
and accessing private information (Bharath et al. 2011; Elsas 2005; Stein 2015) even 
though both is costly for the bank (Diamond 1984). If the bank is the main lender of the 
firm and high relationship strength exists, the gains from monitoring exceed the 
underlying costs. Hence, the bank has the incentive to maintain the position of being a 
firm’s exclusive lender and invests in the relation with the firm. If the firm receives credit 
from multiple banks (i.e. low relationship strength exists), then the main bank has less 
incentive to acquire costly private information due to a potential free rider problem 
(Diamond 1984). In sum, if the firm borrows the majority of its debt from one bank, then 
this bank replenish accounting information with additional private information channels. 
According to these considerations, we expect that relationship strength decreases the 
effect of accruals quality on cost of debt.  
The second hypothesis deals with the influence of relationship duration on the 
effect of accruals quality on firms’ loan rate. Relationship duration captures the 
subsequent years where the main lender does not change and describes the bank’s learning 
process. As the relationship goes on, banks will gain accounting and private information, 
which will lead to a better interpretation of accruals quality. On the one hand, as the 
relationship proceeds, banks acquire accounting information through the financial 
statements handed in by firms. On the other hand, repeated interactions and tracking 
firms’ bank accounts enables banks to learn about firms’ cash flow patterns. Since 
accruals quality is a measure which shows how well earnings match into past, present, 
and future cash flows, the knowledge about cash flow dynamics leads to a better 
understanding of accruals quality. Another conceivable explanation is that banks 
accumulate other information, which indirectly help them interpret accruals quality better. 
First, it is reasonable to assume that banks keep regular contact with firms’ managers, to 
talk about future projects and get to know managers’ skills. Through private information 
about future projects, the bank can better predict future cash flows based on the same 
financial report. Furthermore, if banks are familiar with managers’ skills, they can better 
differentiate between innate and discretionary accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 
2002; Demerjian et al. 2013). A second example of other information is gathering 
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knowledge about a firm’s industry. This helps banks to position firms relative to their 
industry peers. Firms in volatile industries will possibly have lower accruals quality due 
to larger estimation errors, even if they have highly skilled managers (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002). In sum, repeated interactions with firms’ manager and gathering 
knowledge about firms’ industry will lead banks to understand accruals quality better. 
Altogether, the longer the relationship, the better the bank measures and interprets 
earnings related information risk. Therefore, we expect that relationship duration 
increases the effect of accruals quality on the cost of debt. 
2.3. Variable measurement 
2.3.1. Cost of debt 
To calculate our cost of debt proxy, we rely on the balance sheet approach and define the 
measure as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑗,𝑡
∗ 100, (1) 
where Inte=interest expense, AvgIntBLiab=average interest bearing liabilities over the 
years t and t-1, j=1,…,N is the firm index, and t=1,…,T the year index. 
Several prior studies use this ratio with some differences in the measurement of 
the denominator (Bigus et al. 2009; Francis et al. 2005; Karjalainen 2011; Minnis 2011; 
Pittman and Fortin 2004; Stein 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). Another possibility 
to define cost of debt relies on information about the interest rate on a firm’s loan. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the interest rate on a firm´s most recent loan and Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998) employ the interest rate spread10. However, each approach has its pros 
and cons. The advantage of credit data is a more precise cost of debt measure. The 
drawback is a very limited sample size that exacerbates generalizability and impedes the 
examination of questions that require larger panels. In contrast, even though cost of debt 
estimates based on the balance sheet approach can be noisy, more observations for the 
econometric analysis are available. Since we lack data on the interest rate on a firm’s 
loan, we calculate cost of debt with the balance sheet approach. 
                                                 
10 The interest rate spread is defined as the difference between the interest rate on firm loans and the prime 
rate, which is for the Euro area the three-month EURIBOR. 
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Two reasons cause the noisiness of the cost of debt measure from eq. (1). The first 
relates to the denominator (AvgIntBLiab) with only two values, at the beginning and end 
of the year. Hence, the value of the denominator could be very small at the end of the year 
(Lev and Sunder 1979). Dropping extreme outliers mitigates this problem. Even though 
the balance sheet approach leads to noisy estimates, the literature accepts this drawback 
(Pittman and Fortin 2004). The second reason is a special case for German firms and 
concerns the non-financial part of the numerator and denominator of eq. (1), resulting 
especially from the accountancy of pension provisions11. More specifically, we include 
financial liabilities (short and long term loans from financial institutions, connected 
companies and owners) and non-financial liabilities (pension provisions12) in the cost of 
debt denominator (AvgIntBLiab). The numerator (Inte) consistently includes financial 
interest expense and non-financial interest expense13. However, we are interested only in 
the cost of debt charged by the lenders to examine our main research question. We solve 
this problem by controlling for the share of pension provisions, loans from owners and 
associated corporations in our regression analysis. Additionally, we introduce an adjusted 
cost of debt proxy in the robustness section (Section 2.6.1), which reflects the cost of debt 
charged by banks. 
2.3.2. Accruals quality 
Our accruals quality proxy is based on the modification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model by McNichols (2002). The original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is a 
regression of current accruals on past, current, and future cash flows. The current accruals, 
                                                 
11 German firms traditionally fund the defined-benefit pension plans internally via provisions, whereby US 
companies use external funding via pension funds. German firms report the pension liabilities on the 
balance sheet as part of other non-current liabilities. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that 29% of German 
firms’ liabilities are other liabilities (for US firms it is only 5.8%) and 50% of other liabilities are pension 
provisions. At the end of 2002 pension provisions equaled one third of the German equity market 
capitalization (Gerke et al. 2005) and have a significant share in the balance sheet of German firms. 
12 Bigus et al.  (2009) examine German firms and conjecture that peculiarities of the German Tax Law and 
German GAAP bias their cost of debt measure upward for two reasons. First, the interest expense of off-
balance leasing agreements increases the numerator (Inte), while the off-balance leasing agreements do 
not increase the denominator (AvgIntBLiab). Second, the interest expense of some forms of equity (e.g. 
silence partnerships) increases the numerator without increasing the denominator. We suggest pension 
provisions as a third factor – specific to the German institutional setting - that potentially biases German 
cost of debt estimates.    
13 The future expenses for pensions have to be incorporated in the balance sheet. Therefore, the pension 
expectations are discounted to the present value and this amount is included in the balance sheet under 
the item “other liabilities”. In the following years, those initially booked pension provisions increase by 
the yearly discounted amount and are booked against interest expense (Baetge et al. 2012). 
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which cannot be explained through past, present, and future cash flows are defined as 
abnormal accruals (representing low accruals quality). In the modification by McNichols 
(2002), property, plant and equipment, and change in revenue are added as additional 
explanatory variables to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach. McNichols (2002) 
argues that cash flows cannot cover the complete variation in accruals and that proxies 
for the uncertainty of the environment would increase the explanation of the accrual 
changes.  
On the one hand, changes in a firm’s environment lead to variation in normal 
accruals which is explained by the exogenous variables of the regression. On the other 
hand, variations in abnormal accruals are the result of management discretion and the 
driver of bad accruals quality, and hence represent the unexplained part of the regression 
estimation. Therefore, to calculate accruals quality, we first estimate eq. (2) for each of 
the 374 industry-year clusters14 of our sample and require a minimum of 20 firms in each 
cluster: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 
(2) 
 +𝛼4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, 
where TCA=total current accruals15=ΔCA - ΔCL - ΔCash + ΔSTDEBT, CFO=cash flow 
from operations=NIBE - TA, NIBE=net income before extraordinary items, TA16=total 
accruals=ΔCA - ΔCL - ΔCash + ΔSTDEBT – Dep - ΔProv, ΔCA=change in current assets, 
ΔCL=change in current liabilities, ΔCash=change in cash, ΔSTDEBT=change in debt in 
current liabilities 17 , Dep=depreciation and amortization expense, ∆Rev=change in 
revenue, PPE=gross value of property, plant and equipment, j=1,…,N firm index, and 
t=1,…,T year index. All variables of the regression are divided by average total assets of 
the previous (t-1) and current year (t).  
                                                 
14 We use two-digit industry codes that are comparable to three-digit NAICS, Fama and French 48 industries 
or six-digit GICS, all of which give a similar number of observations per industry (Bhojraj et al. 2003). 
15 Since we do not have data from cash flow statements, we calculate total current accruals with the indirect 
balance sheet method according to Francis et al. (2005). They show that the results with the indirect 
balance sheet method are comparable to the results calculated with the data out of the cash flow statement. 
16  Daske et al. (2006) propose the modification of TA including changes in provisions (ΔProv). In 
unreported analyses, we calculate total accruals without including changes in provisions as: TA=ΔCA - 
ΔCL - ΔCash + ΔSTDEBT – Dep. Our results are robust to this modification. 
17 We use change in loans instead of change in debt in current liabilities. 
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Accruals quality is measured using the residuals of the estimated eq. (2). It is 
calculated as the rolling standard deviation (std. dev.) of the residual values over the past 
five years (from t to t-4). Since accruals quality is a result of a rolling std. dev. with the 
window five, there are a few annual results for each firm. To get accruals quality in year 
t, years t to t-4 are needed to calculate an annual accruals quality measure for each firm, 
σ(εt)j,t18.We follow the recent literature (García-Teruel et al. 2014) to proxy accruals 
quality and use the negative value of the std. dev. of residuals: -σ(εt)j,t, where larger values 
of -σ(εt)j,t represent better accruals quality. Similarly as Demerjian et al. (2013), we rank 
accruals quality by year using deciles to make the estimates more comparable across time 
and to decrease the influence of extreme observations. Thus, our accruals quality measure 
is defined as: AQj,t=[-σ(εt)j,t]DECILE19. 
2.3.3. Relationship lending 
We use relationship strength and relationship duration as relationship intensity measures. 
Relationship strength is usually measured as the proportion of a lender’s debt in the firm’s 
overall debt. We focus on the relationship with the main lender (Bharath et al. 2011; Stein 
2015). If the main lender holds a high proportion of the firm’s debt the relationship is 
assumed to be strong (Elsas and Krahnen 1998). We calculate relationship strength as: 
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡
. (3) 
We use this measure since it reflects the lender’s incentive to acquire private 
information and to monitor the firm (Diamond 1984). The main lender has more 
incentives to acquire private information and to monitor the firm if relationship strength 
is large. 
Relationship duration serves as another proxy for relationship lending (e.g. Berger 
and Udell 1995; Degryse and Ongena 2005; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Elsas and 
Krahnen 1998; Petersen and Rajan 1994; Stein 2015). The duration of the relationship 
between lender and borrower is measured in years and represents the repeated interaction 
between lender and borrower. We do not have data on the duration of the relationships. 
                                                 
18 E. g. a firm with 12 years of data will have 7 annual accruals quality observations. 
19 In unreported analysis, we use a continuous variable and the results remain similar. 
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Nevertheless, we measure relationship duration as the number of subsequent years a firm 
has the same main lender. If the firm changes the main lender, the duration is set to 1 
(Stein 2015). Thus, relationship duration is defined as follows: 
𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟. (4) 
2.3.4. Model specification 
To test the effect of accruals quality on the cost of debt we specify the following model: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 
(5) 
  + 𝛽2𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 
  + 𝛽3𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
  + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
  + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 
  + ∑𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡, 
where COD=Inte divided by AvgIntBLiab times 100 defined in eq. (1), AQ=decile rank 
(by year) of accruals quality estimated with eq. (2), STRENGTH=relationship strength 
between main lender and firm defined in eq. (3), DURATION=relationship duration of 
the relationship with the main lender defined in eq. (4), ∑𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 includes 
other control variables, which are: LEVERAGE=total liabilities divided by total assets, 
LNASSETS=natural logarithm of total assets, ROA=net income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged assets, COVRATIO=interest expense divided by operating 
income, σ(NIBE)=rolling 5-year window std. dev. of net income before extraordinary 
items, scaled by average total assets, ASSOCIATE=loans from associated corporations 
divided by total liabilities, OWNER=loans from owners divided by total liabilities, 
PENSION=pension provisions divided by total liabilities, SECURED=secured debt 
divided by total debt, ∑𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 =year dummies, ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 =industry dummies, 
∑𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑚=legal form dummies, j=1,…,N firm index, n=1,…,N control variable 
index, t=1,…,T year index, k=1,…,K industry index, and m=1,…,M legal form index. All 
variables are defined formally in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
  
   
Variable Definition Source 
  
Cost of debt proxies  
COD Cost of debt calculated as interest expense to 
average interest bearing liabilities 
USTAN 
COD_adj Adjusted cost of debt estimated with eq. ((6) USTAN 
  
Accruals quality proxies  
AQ Decile rank (by year) of accruals quality according 
to McNichols 2002 estimated with eq. (2) and based 
on rolling 5-year window std. dev.  
USTAN 
AQ(sdDD) Decile rank (by year) of accruals quality according 
to Dechow and Dichev estimated with eq. (8) and 
based on rolling 5-year window std. dev. 
USTAN 
AQ(sdBS) Decile rank (by year) of accruals quality according 
to Ball and Shivakumar (2006) estimated with eq. 
(9) and based on rolling 5-year window std. dev. 
USTAN 
AQ(J) Decile rank (by year) of accruals quality according 
to Jones estimated with eq. (10) and based on 
absolute values 
USTAN 
AQ(mJ) Decile rank (by year) of accruals quality according 
to modified Jones estimated with eq. (11) and based 
on absolute values 
USTAN 
  
Relationship lending proxies  
STRENGTH Loans from main lender divided by overall loans MiMiK 
STRENGTH(HIGH 50%) Dummy =1 if firms STRENGTH > sample’s 
median STRENGTH 
MiMiK 
STRENGTH(HHI) Borrowers’ concentration index as defined in eq. 
(14) 
MiMiK 
(Continued) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
   
   
STRENGTH(COUNT) Negative of number of lenders MiMiK 
DURATION Subsequent years where main lender is the same MiMiK 
DURATION(HIGH 50%) Dummy =1 if firms DURATION > sample’s 
median DURATION 
MiMiK 
DURATION(HIGH 75%) Dummy =1 if firms DURATION > sample’s 75th 
percentile DURATION 
MiMiK 
DURATION(LN) Natural logarithm of DURATION MiMiK 
  
Control variables  
LEVERAGE Total liabilities divided by total assets USTAN 
LNASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets USTAN 
ROA Net interest before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets 
USTAN 
COVRATIO Interest expense divided by operating income USTAN 
σ(NIBE) Rolling 5-year window std. dev. of net interest 
before extraordinary items, scaled by average total 
assets 
USTAN 
ASSOCIATE Loans from associated corporations divided by total 
liabilities 
USTAN 
OWNER Loans from owners divided by total liabilities USTAN 
PENSION Pension provisions divided by total liabilities USTAN 
SECURED Secured debt divided by total debt USTAN 
 
The dependent variable is the one-year-ahead cost of debt. The coefficient β1 
measures the main effect of accruals quality if the interaction terms (β2 and β3) are not 
included in the regression estimation. 
The main contribution of this study is captured in β2, which represents the 
coefficient of the interaction between accruals quality and relationship strength and in β3, 
which represents the coefficient of the interaction of accruals quality and relationship 
duration. 
 20 
 
According to theory, higher accruals quality should reduce information risk for 
the lender and therefore decrease cost of debt. Following this argumentation, the main 
effect of accruals quality is expected to be negative (β1<0). Regarding the interaction 
between accruals quality and relationship strength, we expect the coefficient of 
AQ*STRENGTH to be positive (H1), since accruals quality and relationship strength 
should behave as substitutes (i.e. β2>0). Therefore, the main effect (β1) and the interaction 
term (β2) are expected to show opposing signs. Furthermore, we expect the interaction 
term concerning relationship duration (AQ*DURATION) to be negative (H2) because 
banks learn to interpret accounting information better with longer relationship duration 
(i.e. β3<0). Thus, the main effect (β1) and the interaction term regarding relationship 
duration (β3) should have the same sign.  
We control for relationship lending (STRENGTH and DURATION), other 
control variables, year, industry and legal form fixed effects20. We determine other control 
variables according to Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) which identify the following financial 
ratio categories to explain ex-ante cost of debt: leverage ratios, size variables, profitability 
ratios, interest coverage ratios, and stability variables (earnings stability or instability). 
Since the ex-post cost of debt (measured with the balance sheet approach) is a 
consequence of ex-ante cost of debt (debt ratings), we take these ratios as control variables 
in the cost of debt analysis21. Therefore, similar to other studies in this field we apply the 
following basic control variables in our cost of debt model: LEVERAGE, LNASSETS, 
ROA, COVRATIO 22 , σ(NIBE) 23 , and SECURED. Furthermore, we employ other 
commonly used control variables in previous bank-based studies (Bigus et al. 2009; 
Francis et al. 2005; Stein 2015; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). The proportion of loans 
from associated corporations (ASSOCIATE) and owners (OWNER) serve as additional 
                                                 
20 Since we do not calculate the debt price as a spread we include yield on corporate bonds to control for 
macroeconomic effects in our robustness analysis (not reported). The results do not change. 
21 German firms largely rely on private debt provided by house banks. To determine a firm’s loan price, 
house banks use their own credit ratings. The credit rating of a firm typically depends on available 
securities, the business strategy and its financial performance. The rating determines the premium above 
the base rate that firms must pay to receive a loan (Palepu 2007). 
22 Other studies use interest coverage (Francis et al. 2005) or the natural logarithm of interest coverage 
(Bharath et al. 2008). To avoid multicollinearity, we use the coverage ratio, which is the reciprocal value 
of interest coverage. If we do not control for the coverage ratio our results remain the same (not reported). 
23 Other empirical studies use similar control variables, e.g. Francis et al. (2005), Karjalainen (2011), and 
Bigus et al. (2009). 
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controls. Moreover, we control for the proportion of pension liabilities (PENSION), since 
a yearly amount is accounted for as interest expense and leads to an overestimation of 
interest expense. 
The predicted signs for the relationship lending variables is according to theory 
and previous empirical results ambiguous. The relationship lending theory agrees that 
stronger relationship (longer and wider relationship between firm and bank) leads to more 
accumulation of soft information, to cost savings for the bank and to higher potential 
benefits for the firm (Kano et al. 2011). The potential benefits are for example better 
credit terms (lower cost of debt, lower probability to pledge collateral and longer loan 
maturity). The consequential hypothesis would be that more intense relationships 
between firm and bank lead to better credit terms for the firm. However, empirical 
evidence on the effect of relationship variables on credit terms is controversial. Longer 
relationships leads in some studies to lower COD (Berger and Udell 1995), other studies 
report no effect on COD (Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Machauer 
and Weber 1998) and some report even higher COD (Angelini et al. 1998; Degryse and 
van Cayseele 2000; Stein 2015). Using STRENGTH as relationship variable, studies 
report no effect (Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Lehmann and 
Neuberger 2001; Machauer and Weber 1998) or lower COD (D’Auria et al. 1999; 
Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Stein 2015). There are two possible explanations why 
these findings are inconsistent with the above hypothesis. First, theoretically the bank can 
keep all cost savings from an intense relationship for itself and not shift it to the firm. 
This could be in situations where the bank acquires private information and gains an 
information monopoly over other non-informed banks, which can lead to a lock in 
problem for the firm where the bank can keep all cost savings and even extract further 
profit (Sharpe 1990). Second, independently of the benefit shifting between bank and 
firm, other factors can influence the benefits of the relationship. Kano et al. (2011) show 
that financial statement lending, bank organizational structure and bank competition 
influence the relationship benefit effect. In summary, the predicted sign of STRENGTH 
and DURATION can be positive or negative, depending on the willingness of the bank 
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to share cost savings with the borrower and depending on other factors, which influence 
the benefits of the relationship. 
The predicted signs of the remaining control variables are in most cases 
theoretically and empirically unambiguous. Larger firms and firms with higher 
profitability are recognized as less risky and therefore we predict a negative sign for the 
coefficients of LNASSETS and ROA. The volatility of earnings (σ(NIBE)) is an 
additional proxy for credit risk, since risk not only depends on profitability but also on 
the stability of earnings. Thus, we predict a positive relationship between σ(NIBE) and 
cost of debt (Francis et al. 2005). Secured loans (SECURED) should lead to higher cost 
of debt, in consideration of riskier borrowers have to provide more security and have to 
pay higher interest rates for debt issuances (e.g. Bharath et al. 2008; Pittman and Fortin 
2004). In addition, the relationship between leverage and cost of debt could be positive 
or negative. It could be positive because higher leveraged firms have higher financial risk 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994; Pittman and Fortin 2004). However, there is some evidence of 
a negative relationship (Francis et al. 2005; Minnis 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015) 
and the reasons for this are threefold. First, it can be that the firm is highly leveraged, 
since it has large loans and large loans are offered at lower interest rates (Vander 
Bauwhede et al. 2015). Second, the inverse relation could be a mechanical relationship, 
since COD is decreasing and LEVERAGE is increasing in interest bearing liabilities 
(Karjalainen 2011). Third, it is argued that the negative relationship with leverage is a 
result of cost of debt being a noisy proxy (Francis et al. 2005; Pittman and Fortin 2004). 
Furthermore, interest coverage is often defined as operating income divided by interest 
expense and shows how capable the firm is to pay back the interest expense of current 
loans (Francis et al. 2005; Minnis 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). Therefore, higher 
interest coverage should be negatively related to cost of debt. However, to avoid 
multicollinearity between interest coverage and ROA, we define interest coverage 
inversely as interest expense divided by operating income (Ahmed et al. 2000; Koren et 
al. 2014). Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between the coverage ratio 
(COVRATIO) and cost of debt. Finally, for loans from associated corporations 
(ASSOCIATE), loans from owners (OWNER), and for pension liabilities (PENSION) 
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the relationship to cost of debt could be negative or positive. Considering cost of debt 
being a proxy, which includes firms’ overall interest expense and interest bearing 
liabilities (previous mentioned liabilities and bank loans), the estimated sign for 
ASSOCIATE, OWNER, and PENSION will indicate if banks’ interest rate is lower or 
higher compared to the interest expense which is a result of ASSOCIATE, OWNER, and 
PENSION. First, the interest rates of loans from associated corporations and owners are 
the result of inter firm negotiations and could be lower or higher than interest rates 
charged by banks. Second, the legislator does not set the discount rate for pension 
liabilities and each firm is free to estimate an individual discount rate, which can be lower 
or higher than the interest rate charged by banks. Finally, the predicted sign for 
ASSOCIATE, OWNER, and PENSION could be negative because of a mechanical 
relationship with COD (the numerator of the former and the denominator of the latter 
increases with interest bearing liability). 
2.4. Data 
2.4.1. The peculiarities of the German setting 
The German setting is for various reasons especially valuable for the analyses of accruals 
quality, relationship strength, relationship duration, and cost of debt. Germany has a bank-
based financial system (Allen and Gale 1995) where firms rely mostly on private bank 
debt24. This system is characterized by house banks which traditionally lend money to 
firms (Elsas and Krahnen 2003) and built strong relationship ties to the particular firms. 
In addition, we analyze not listed companies that are especially dependent on bank debt. 
Furthermore, the German law requires banks to report large credit exposures for the 
particular quarter to the Deutsche Bundesbank. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, 
the credit register from Deutsche Bundesbank is the only register tracking the loan records 
on lender-borrower level for German firms. This allows us to test the effect of accruals 
                                                 
24 Dickopf et al. (2007) report that German private SME firms rely more on private bank loans (53% of total 
liabilities) compared to US firms (23% of total liabilities), Furthermore, Francfort and Rudolph (1992) 
give the first empirical evidence on the difference in debt importance for Germany and US. They show 
that German firms use relatively more debt compared to US firms controlling for other important variables. 
Bigus et al. (2009) note that the median debt ratio for German firms in their sample is 86%, whereas 
Berger and Udell (1998) show only about 50% for US firms. 
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quality on firms’ loan rate according to the level of relationship strength and relationship 
duration. Finally, Burgstahler et al. (2006) explicitly highlight the German system as an 
example of “insider access” to information. Hence, it is in particularly worthwhile to test 
the influence of this “insider information” on the role of accruals quality for German 
private firms. 
2.4.2. Sample construction 
We work with two matched datasets, the credit register (MiMiK) and the firms’ annual 
financial statement data (USTAN), both provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. To merge 
both data sets a propensity score matching algorithm based on string matching was used 
(Goldbach and Nitsch 2014). The underlying data set for the relationship lending 
variables is MiMiK25. All other variables are based on USTAN26.  
 
Table 2: Sample construction 
    
    
  Firm-year observations  
  Dropped Remained Period 
    
Initial sample  253,702 1987-2013 
     
Less:    
1. Firm-years with consolidated, IFRS or US-
GAAP financial statements 
2,610 251,092 1987-2013 
2. Firm-year with opening balances 2,776 248,316 1987-2013 
3. Quoted Firms 4,308 244,008 1987-2013 
4. Firms from the financial services industry 233 243,775 1987-2013 
5. Firm-years with missing industry 
classifications 
559 243,216 1987-2013 
6. Firms without bank debt 36,427 206,789 1987-2013 
7. Years of financial crisis and years after 
BilMoG (2009-2013) 
37,135 169,654 1987-2008 
8. Not SMEs 34,293 135,361 1987-2008 
9. Missing data for the calculation of variables, 
missing lagged and forward data required by 
our models 
59,023 76,338 1987-2008 
10. Firms with less than 12 years of observations 
and industry-year clusters with less than 20 
firms 
30,419 45,919 1987-2008 
(Continued)  
 
 
                                                 
25 Schmieder (2006) explains the dataset in detail. 
26  This data is collected directly from Deutsche Bundesbank due to exchange transactions of banks. 
Goldbach and Nitsch (2014) provide more information on this dataset. 
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Table 2 (Continued)    
    
    
11. Missing accruals quality values (accruals 
quality is calculated using rolling 5-year 
windows) 
14,961 30,958 1997-2008 
12. Missing relationship lending values (we do not 
have data for the years before 2002) 
20,934 10,024 2002-2008 
    
Final sample  10,024 2002-2008 
    
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, 
MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: We use a matched sample of the MiMiK and USTAN database from Deutsche Bundesbank. The 
source for the data on relationship lending is the MiMiK database (i.e. credit register) and data for all 
other variables comes from the USTAN database (i.e. financial statements). 
The final sample includes accruals quality based on rolling 5-year windows, which is calculated using 
firm data beginning with 1997. 
 
 
The initial sample (merged MiMiK with USTAN) comprises 253,702 firm-years 
for 19,481 firms from 1987-2013. Table 2 shows the sample selection to get the final 
sample of 10,024 firm-years for 2,159 firms between 200227 and 2008. We also winsorize 
all variables used in eq. (2) and eq. (5) at the 1th and 99th percentiles28. 
Our final sample includes non-consolidated financial statements of German 
private firms, which are under the German GAAP. We do not include publicly listed firms, 
firms from the financial industry and firm-years with missing industry classifications. 
Furthermore, we use only the pre-financial crisis period, because the period between 2009 
and 2014 (crisis and post-crisis) includes a change in the accounting standard and the 
financial crisis. The German Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG) was 
established in 2009. The application of the BilMoG starts in the year 2010 and a voluntary 
adoption was already in 2009 allowed. 
Therefore, we drop in our main analysis the years 2009-2014, to account for both, 
the BilMoG adoption and the financial crisis. In addition, we focus only on SMEs, since 
we analyze the effect of accruals quality (an indicator of information asymmetry) on cost 
                                                 
27 The accruals quality proxies are calculated using firm data beginning with 1997. 
28 In studies where cost of debt is calculated following the balance sheet approach, interest bearing debt - 
the denominator of this cost of debt proxy - is noisy due to the calculation with only two observations 
Dechow (1994) and extreme outliers have to be dropped. In a not reported analysis, we additionally drop 
outliers of cost of debt at different percentile values. The results do not change. 
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of debt and according to Elsas and Krahnen (1998) the role of information asymmetry is 
especially high for firms of moderate size.  
Our sample incorporates some limitations29. According to German Banking Act 
(Section 14), banking institutions have to report exposure to individual borrowers or 
single borrower units, which are above €1.5 million at the respective quarter. This means 
the exposure could be to an individual borrower or the sum of exposures to borrowers 
belonging to one borrower unit. Thus, a large part of single exposures in our dataset are 
below €1.5 million, since the exposure criteria is used on a group level (Schmieder 2006; 
Stein 2015). However, our sample contains relatively large loans and therefore relatively 
large SMEs compared to the total population of German SMEs. However, in line with 
Bigus et al. (2009), we observe that our median firm has total assets less than €8 million 
and conclude that we still observe enough small firms in our sample. Furthermore, since 
we calculate our relationship lending variable with respect to the main lender, this 
problem should not be that important (Stein 2015). 
2.5. Main results 
In this section we validate the cost of debt measure, provide some descriptive statistics 
and univariate tests. Then, we show the main regression results. 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3, Panel B, confirms that our cost of debt measure is reliable compared to 
macroeconomic reports. The average one-year ahead cost of debt for our sample in the 
period from 2003 to 2008 is 4.96% which is similar to the public statistics of annual 
interest rates30 (5.04%) in the same period (reported in Table 3 as RMFI31).  
The graph in Table 3, Panel A, shows that in some parts of the period cost of debt 
underestimates and in other parts cost of debt overestimates the RMFI. Cost of debt 
reflects the average interest rate for current loans but also for previous loans, whereby the 
                                                 
29 Stein (2015) and Bigus et al. (2009) discuss the limitations of the data in detail. 
30 The interest rate of banks and other financial institutions to non-financial companies in Germany for short 
and long term debt is a time series from the European System of Central Banks and available at: 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/ESCB_Time_Series/eszb_
zeitreihen_node.html?openNodeId=500220, last access: 16/11/2015. 
31 Calculated as an average of the interest rate on debt with maturity under 1 year, between 1 and 5 years, 
and over 5 years. 
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RMFI corresponds to the new approved credit lines of the particular year – being a public 
statistic of the yearly charged interest rates. This fact could be the explanation for the 
observed differences. 
 
Table 3: Cost of debt validation 
 
 
Panel A: COD and RMFI historical development 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Yearly average COD, RMFI, and firm-year observations 
Yeara RMFI COD Observations 
2003 5.15 4.97 1,932 
2004 4.87 4.82 1,838 
2005 4.67 4.69 1,771 
2006 4.78 4.84 1,641 
2007 5.25 5.14 1,480 
2008 5.51 5.27 1,362 
 Øb 5.04 4.96 - 
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, 
MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: Panel A and B compare yearly mean values of cost of debt with the yearly mean values of RMFI. 
COD= cost of debt calculated as interest expense to average interest bearing liabilities and RMFI=interest 
rate of banks and other financial institutions for non-financial companies in Germany for short and long 
term debt, calculated as an average of the interest rate on debt with maturity less than 1 year, between 1 
and 5 years, and over 5 years. 
a We show only cost of debt used in the regression analysis, which are one-year-ahead values and therefore 
cost of debt for 2002 is not displayed in this table.  
b The mean of cost of debt (ØCOD=4.96) differs from the sample mean from Table 4 (4.94), since it is 
calculated using the yearly mean values. 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 4 reveal that our sample consists of small and 
medium privately held firms. Thus, the mean (median) assets equal €12 (€8) million and 
the mean (median) revenue is about €21 (€16) million. In detail, about 60% of our sample 
consists of small firms (assets below €10 million) and 40% are medium size firms (assets 
between €10 and €50 million)32.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
       
       
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 10th Median 90th 90th -10th 
FINANCIALS             
Assets (€ million) 12.171 16.804 2.715 7.912 22.721 20.006 
Revenue (€ million) 20.527 17.996 3.504 15.771 43.414 39.910 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE            
COD (%) 4.938 1.990 2.669 4.791 7.212 4.543 
VARIABLE OF INTEREST           
AQ 5.499 2.873 1.000 6.000 9.000 8.000 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS     
STRENGTH 0.778 0.245 0.412 0.893 1.000 0.588 
DURATION 2.759 1.590 1.000 2.000 5.000 4.000 
OTHER CONTROLS             
LEVERAGE 0.800 0.151 0.589 0.828 0.972 0.383 
LNASSETS 8.984 0.867 7.907 8.976 10.031 2.124 
ROA 0.057 0.085 -0.022 0.039 0.166 0.188 
COVRATIO 0.419 1.290 0.023 0.370 1.105 1.082 
σ(NIBE) 0.039 0.031 0.010 0.031 0.080 0.070 
ASSOCIATE 0.048 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.162 
OWNER 0.161 0.200 0.000 0.077 0.470 0.470 
PENSION 0.055 0.099 0.000 0.002 0.181 0.181 
SECURED 0.272 0.321 0.000 0.070 0.785 0.785 
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, 
MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: The sample includes 10,024 firm-years, 2,159 firms from 2002-2008. The accruals quality proxy 
based on rolling 5-year windows is calculated using firm data beginning with 1997. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                 
32 The thresholds for small and medium-sized firms are according to the EU commission and available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-definition/index_en.htm,  
last access: 14/12/2016. 
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The average firm in our sample is profitable (mean return on assets equals 0.057) 
and highly leveraged (mean leverage ratio equals 0.800), confirming the observation that 
German firms mostly rely on debt financing. Furthermore, the main lender has on average 
78% (STRENGTH) of the overall credit exposure and the average duration of the 
relationship with the main lender is 2.8 years. The last column of the table shows the 
distance between the 90th and the 10th percentile for each variable. The relationship 
between the main bank and a firm at the 10th percentile lasts one year, whereby the 
duration of a firm at the 90th percentile lasts 5 years. Therefore, the distance between the 
firm at the 90th and the firm at the 10th percentile is 4 years. This distance is especially 
important in explaining the regression effect of accruals quality on cost of debt. 
Pearson correlations are shown in Table 5, indicating high correlation between 
σ(NIBE) and AQ (-0.5059) as well as between σ(NIBE) and ROA (0.2796). In unreported 
analysis, we use accruals quality measures which are not highly correlated with σ(NIBE). 
This is the case if we calculate accruals quality with absolute values of residuals. The 
results stay the same. Second, in unreported tests we use Altman Z-score (García-Teruel 
et al. 2014) as an alternative proxy of risk instead of σ(NIBE) and show again that our 
results are not affected. 
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Table 5: Correlations 
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COD 1                         
AQ -0.0263 1                       
STRENGTH -0.0518 -0.0715 1                     
DURATION 0.0368 0.0217 0.1639 1                   
LEVERAGE 0.0390 0.0056 0.0742 -0.0180 1                 
LNASSETS -0.0744 0.1682 -0.5038 0.0192 -0.1862 1               
ROA -0.1169 -0.1153 0.0097 0.0706 -0.2110 0.0387 1             
COVRATIO 0.0583 0.0673 0.0047 0.0107 0.0602 0.0026 -0.0613 1           
σ(NIBE) -0.0219 -0.5059 0.0560 -0.0338 -0.0685 -0.1207 0.2796 -0.1123 1         
ASSOCIATE -0.1128 -0.0568 -0.0640 -0.0242 -0.0682 0.0939 -0.0621 -0.0272 0.0363 1       
OWNER -0.1618 -0.0695 0.0446 0.0521 0.1128 0.0194 0.2200 -0.0231 0.1168 -0.0878 1     
PENSION -0.1971 -0.0984 0.0613 0.0043 -0.1159 -0.0163 -0.0044 -0.0379 0.0688 -0.0457 -0.1723 1   
SECURED 0.0740 0.1291 -0.0722 0.0858 -0.0638 0.1705 -0.0507 0.0513 -0.0737 -0.1087 -0.1794 -0.0544 1 
  
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: This table displays Pearson correlation coefficients for the final sample. Bold parameters are significant at the 5% level or below. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
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2.5.2. Regressions 
Table 6, Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of eq. (5) without and with interaction 
terms. We examine the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt by including only 
accruals quality as explanatory variable (Column 1) and add afterwards the interaction 
terms of accruals quality and relationship lending (Column 2-4). However, we include in 
all specifications relationship lending and other control variables. 
Coefficient estimates for the relationship lending controls confirm the discussed 
ambiguity from section 2.3.4. On the one hand, STRENGTH has a negative and 
significant coefficient in all four specifications (Column 1-4) confirming the theory that 
banks are willing to share relationship benefits with their borrowers. On the other hand, 
DURATION is in most cases positive and significant, giving a hint towards a lock in 
problem of relationship lending. 
The estimated coefficients for the remaining control variables have the predicted 
signs in all four specifications (Column 1-4). As expected, COVRATIO has a positive 
and significant influence on the cost of debt. In contrast, LNASSETS, ROA, 
ASSOCIATE, OWNER and PENSION exhibit a negative and significant effect on the 
cost of debt. The coefficient for LEVERAGE, σ(NIBE) and SECURED have the expected 
sign, but are insignificant33. 
Table 6, Panel A, Column 1, shows the main effect of accruals quality on cost of 
debt if we control for relationship lending, but do not include interactions. The coefficient 
estimate of AQ is highly significant and negative (𝛽1=-0.0412). Moving from the 10th to 
the 90th percentile of AQ34, cost of debt decreases by 32.96 bp. The distance between the 
90th and the 10th percentile of AQ equals 8 (see descriptive statistics from Table 6). 
Therefore, the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt is calculated as follows 𝛽1 * 8 AQ 
differences=-0.0412 * 8 AQ differences = 0.3296% or 32.96 bp. This means, the firm will 
gain 32.96 bp cost of debt benefits, which corresponds to 6.67% of the sample’s average 
                                                 
33 We show in unreported tests that σ(NIBE) is significant in all specifications if we use the Fama-Macbeth 
regression approach Fama and MacBeth (1973). 
34 For the ease of interpretation, we calculate all economic effects on cost of debt comparing a high accruals 
quality (relationship strength, relationship duration) firm (value of 90th percentile) with a low accruals 
quality (relationship strength, relationship duration) firm (value of 10th percentile). 
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cost of debt by improving its accruals quality from the 10th to the 90th percentile. The 
economic effect of accruals quality reported by Francis et al. (2005) equals 13% and is 
far more higher35. Yet, if we, analogous to them, do not include relationship controls at 
all in the regression, the coefficient of accruals quality is slightly higher in magnitude 
(𝛽1=-0.0421) and significance (t=-3.25) but still lower as reported by Francis et al. (2005). 
Certainly, we compare an effect of two studies with different firms and time periods. 
Nevertheless, this gives a first hint towards accruals quality to be less important in bank-
based financial systems, but still playing an essential role. 
Column 2-4 reveal the estimates of eq. (5) with interaction terms. In Column 2 
and 3 we introduce only one interaction term separately and in Column 4 both interaction 
terms are considered simultaneously. Column 2 shows how relationship strength 
influences the main effect of accruals quality on firms’ loan rate. We find a significantly 
positive coefficient estimate for the interaction term AQ * STRENGTH confirming the 
first hypothesis. This outcome indicates that relationship strength decreases the effect of 
accruals quality. The cost of debt benefit from accruals quality equals 56.85 bp for a firm 
with STRENGTH at the 90th percentile compared to only 18.32 bp for a firm with 
STRENGTH at the 10th percentile. Specifically, the effect of accruals quality on cost of 
debt according to different levels of relationship strength is calculated as follows: (𝛽1 + 
𝛽2 * STRENGTH) * 8 AQ differences = (-0.1048 + 0.0819 * STRENGTH) * 8 AQ 
differences. Therefore, the effect of accruals quality for a firm with STRENGTH at the 
10th percentile equals = (-0.1048 + 0.0819 * 0.412) * 8 AQ differences = -0.5685% or -
56.85 bp and for a firm with STRENGTH at the 90th percentile = (-0.1048 + 0.0819 * 1) 
* 8 AQ differences = -0.1832% or -18.32 bp. Thus, we find that a firm with high 
relationship strength gets 3 times less cost of debt benefits from accruals quality than 
those with low relationship strength. The reason for this result might be that if banks have 
strong relationships, they are the exclusive lender and motivated to monitor the firm and 
acquire private information (Diamond 1984). Consequently, the bank relies more on the 
                                                 
35 Francis et al. (2005) compare the highest accruals quality (AQ=10) to the lowest accruals quality (AQ=1) 
which leads to 9 decile differences. If we calculate our economic effects according to them we get a cost 
of debt benefit of -37.08 bp (represents 7.51% of the sample’ average cost of debt) which is half of the 
economic effect reported by Francis et al. (2005).  
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costly gathered private information and less on accounting information. Our results are in 
line with the intuition of Cassar et al. (2015) who conclude that alternative information 
sources substitute each other. 
Column 3 shows how relationship duration impacts the effect of accruals quality 
on firms’ loan rate. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is negative and 
highly significant, thus indicating that the accruals quality effect increases with the level 
of relationship duration and confirming the second hypothesis. Specifically, the cost of 
debt benefit of accruals quality increases from 13.28 bp to 57.12 bp going from the 10th 
percentile to the 90th percentile of DURATION. Peculiarly, the effect of accruals quality 
on cost of debt according to different levels of relationship duration is calculated as 
follows: (𝛽1 + 𝛽3 * DURATION) * 8 AQ differences = (- 0.0029 - 0.0137 * DURATION) 
* 8 AQ differences. So, the effect of accruals quality for a firm with a short duration 
equals (- 0.0029 - 0.0137 * 1) * 8 AQ differences = -0.1328% or -13.28 bp and for a firm 
with long duration (- 0.0029 - 0.0137 * 5) * 8 AQ differences = -0.5712% or -57.12 bp. 
The result suggests, the longer the relationship lasts, the more data is available which 
generates additional knowledge about accounting quality for the bank. This learning has 
a desired effect on a firms cost of debt, since it enhances the interest rate impairment.  
Column 4 presents estimates when both interaction terms are included 
simultaneously. The effects do not change significantly compared to the findings before.  
The economic effects are illustrated in Table 6, Panel B. As before, the impact of 
accruals quality on cost of debt decreases with higher relationship strength and increases 
with longer duration of the relationship. A firm with relationship duration at the 90th 
percentile and STRENGTH at the 10th percentile gets the highest cost of debt benefit 
from accruals quality (89.79 bp).  
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Table 6: The effect of accruals quality on cost of debt 
 
Panel A: Regression 
   Dependent variable: COD 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef.  (t stat.)  Coef.  (t stat.)  Coef.  (t stat.) 
MAIN EFFECT             
 AQ  -0.0412***   (-3.19)   -0.1048***   (-3.00)   -0.0029   (-0.15)   -0.0727**   (-2.01) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS                     
 AQ * STRENGTH         0.0819**    (1.97)          0.0981**    (2.35) 
 AQ * DURATION              -0.0137**   (-2.52)   -0.0160***   (-2.93) 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS                    
 STRENGTH  -0.6394***   (-4.11)   -1.1022***   (-3.54)   -0.6318***   (-4.10)   -1.1850***   (-3.79) 
 DURATION  -0.0001    (0.00)    0.0007    (0.03)    0.0747*    (1.68)    0.0883**    (1.97) 
OTHER CONTROLS            
 LEVERAGE   0.1746    (0.65)    0.1691    (0.63)    0.1813    (0.68)    0.1757    (0.66) 
 LNASSETS  -0.2189***   (-4.01)   -0.2185***   (-4.01)   -0.2171***   (-4.00)   -0.2162***   (-3.99) 
 ROA  -2.5433***   (-5.88)   -2.5361***   (-5.86)   -2.5711***   (-5.93)   -2.5671***   (-5.93) 
 COVRATIO   0.0624***    (3.74)    0.0632***    (3.79)    0.0625***    (3.76)    0.0635***    (3.82) 
 σ(NIBE)   0.1950    (0.14)    0.1996    (0.14)    0.3090    (0.23)    0.3335    (0.24) 
 ASSOCIATE  -2.7377***   (-9.45)   -2.7530***   (-9.52)   -2.7263***   (-9.38)   -2.7427***   (-9.47) 
 OWNER  -2.1624*** (-10.23)   -2.1685*** (-10.26)   -2.1587*** (-10.21)   -2.1653*** (-10.25) 
 PENSION  -5.1862*** (-13.49)   -5.1681*** (-13.43)   -5.1975*** (-13.51)   -5.1776*** (-13.44) 
 SECURED   0.0974     (1.04)    0.0977    (1.04)    0.1005    (1.08)    0.1015    (1.09) 
CONSTANT   7.8332***   (11.24)    8.1908***  (11.31)    7.5880***  (11.10)    7.9754***  (11.21) 
                    
 N  10,024   10,024   10,024   10,024  
 Adj. R2  0.157   0.158   0.158   0.159  
(Continued) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
  
Panel B: Economic effects of accruals quality on cost of debt according to different levels of relationship strength and relationship duration  
               (in basis points and based on estimates from Column 4) 
  
      STRENGTH 
  Percentile   10th 50th 90th 
    Value 0.412 0.893 1 
DURATION 
10th 1 -38.59 -0.88 7.52 
50th 2 -51.39 -13.68 -5.28 
90th 5 -89.79 -52.08 -43.68 
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: Panel A reports pooled OLS estimates with robust standard errors which are clustered at the firm level. Dummies for year, industry and legal form are included, but not 
reported. T statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Panel A shows the estimates for eq. (5), whereby Column 1 does not include any interaction term, Column 2 and 3 include only one interaction term, and Column 4 includes all 
interaction terms of the model:  
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡  
 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 
  
+ 𝛽3𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + ∑𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡 , 
Panel B displays the economic effects of accruals quality on cost of debt based on the estimation of Column 4. Thus, the table reports cost of debt benefits when improving from the 
10th percentile to the 90th percentile of AQ for different levels of relationship strength and relationship duration. The values for DURATION and STRENGTH are the values of 
their distribution, which are displayed in the descriptive statistics (Table 4). The distance between the 90th and the 10th percentile of AQ equals 8 (see descriptive statistics from 
Table 4). Therefore, the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt according to different levels of relationship strength and relationship duration is calculated as follows: (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗
STRENGTH +  𝛽3 ∗ DURATION)  ∗  8 AQ differences = (−0.0727 + 0.0981 ∗ STRENGTH − 0.016 ∗ DURATION) ∗ 8 AQ differences. 
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Whereby, a firm with DURATION at the 10th percentile and STRENGTH at the 
90th percentile does not get any economically significant cost of debt benefits from 
accruals quality. Contrary, it gets 7.52 basis points higher cost of debt, which represents 
1.52% of the sample’s average cost of debt. This would mean that better accruals quality 
firms are penalized and this is not in line with our predictions. However, the economic 
effect is not high and this is the only case we get an increasing effect of accruals quality 
on cost of debt. The explanation could be the noisy measure of cost of debt. Using the 
adjusted cost of debt measure we only observe decreasing effects on cost of debt (see 
robustness Table 7, Panel A). 
In detail explained, the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt according to 
different levels of relationship strength and relationship duration is calculated as follows: 
(𝛽1 + 𝛽2 * STRENGTH+ 𝛽3 * DURATION) * 8 AQ differences = (-0.0727 + 0.0981 * 
STRENGTH - 0.0160 * DURATION) * 8 AQ differences. This means, a firm with 
DURATION at the 90th percentile and STRENGTH at the 10th percentile gets 89.79 bp 
COD benefit of accruals quality, calculated as (-0.0727 + 0.0981 * 0.412 - 0.0160 * 1) * 
8 AQ differences. Whereby a firm with DURATION at the 10th percentile and 
STRENGTH at the 90th percentile does not get any COD benefit.-Specifically, this is the 
only case where the effect of accruals quality on COD has a positive sign, equaling (-
0.0727 + 0.0981 * 1 - 0.0160 * 5) * 8 AQ differences = +0.0752% or +7.52 bp. 
In summary, we examine how accruals quality affects firms’ cost of debt in a 
bank-based financial system and how relationship lending influences this effect. The 
results show that accruals quality decreases German private firms’ cost of debt and that 
this effect differs significantly with respect to relationship lending.  
2.6. Robustness 
In this section, additional proxies of cost of debt, accruals quality, relationship strength, 
and relationship duration are specified. Then, we report the regression results for each 
proxy.  
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2.6.1. Adjusted measure of cost of debt 
We adjust the cost of debt measure (see descriptive statistics for COD in Table 7) by 
eliminating the non-financial part of cost of debt. To obtain this adjusted measure, we 
regress the cost of debt on all non-financial interest bearing liabilities. Since we omitted 
financial liabilities (bank debt) in the regression, the residuals should reflect the variation 
of cost of debt affected by bank loans. First, we perform the following industry-year 
specific regressions: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜙 + 𝜙1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜙2
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜙3
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑗,𝑡
 
(
(6) 
  + 𝜙4
𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜉𝑗,𝑡, 
where COD=cost of debt calculated with eq. (1), AvgIntBLiab=average of interest 
bearing liabilities over the years t and t-1, ASSOCIATE=loans from associated 
corporations, OWNER=loans from owners, PENSION=pension liabilities, 
OTHER=other interest bearing liabilities. In a next step, to proxy for the variation of cost 
of debt charged by banks, we use the residuals of the estimated eq. ((6): COD_adjj,t=𝜉j,t. 
Finally, to test the effects on COD_adj, we specify the following model: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷_𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 
(7) 
 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 
 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 
 + ∑𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛 + ∑𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 
 + ∑𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡. 
where COD_adj=adjusted cost of debt estimated with eq. ((6), AQ=decile rank (by year) 
of accruals quality estimated with eq. (2), STRENGTH=relationship strength between 
main lender and firm defined in eq. (3), DURATION= relationship duration of the 
relationship with the main lender defined in eq. (4), ∑𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛 includes 
other control variables, which are: LEVERAGE=total liabilities divided by total assets, 
LNASSETS=natural logarithm of total assets, ROA=net income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged assets, COVRATIO=interest expense divided by operating 
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income, σ(NIBE)=rolling 5-year window std. dev. of net income before extraordinary 
items, scaled by average total assets, SECURED=secured debt divided by total debt, 
∑𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡=year dummies, ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘=industry dummies, ∑𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑚=legal 
form dummies, j=1,…,N firm index, n=1,…,N control variable index, t=1,…,T year index, 
k=1,…,K industry index, and m=1,…,M legal form index. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. 
COD_adj represents the fraction of the cost of debt charged by banks. Eq. (5) and 
eq. (7) only differ in the coverage of control variables: pension provisions and loans from 
owner and associated corporations are excluded from eq. (7) because they are considered 
in COD_adj.  
Table 7 reports the estimated regressions for the adjusted cost of debt. The 
structure of the columns coincides with those of Table 6. In Column 1, we again find a 
highly significant negative coefficient estimate for AQ. Moving from the 10th to the 90th 
percentile of AQ is associated with 30.8 bp lower cost of debt. Column 2 highlights that 
the accruals quality effect on cost of debt changes according to the level of relationship 
strength. The interaction term is positive and significant. Going from the 10th to the 90th 
percentile of STRENGTH decreases the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt by 
46.60%. A firm at the 10th percentile of STRENGTH gets 55.03 bp cost of debt benefits 
from accruals quality, while a firm at the 90th percentile of STRENGTH receives only 
23.68 bp cost of debt benefits from accruals quality. Confirming the previous results, the 
interaction term between accruals quality and relationship duration is negative and 
significant. A firm with DURATION at the 10th percentile gets only 18.72 bp cost of 
debt benefits from accruals quality, whereby a firm at the 90th percentile of DURATION 
gets 56.16 bp cost of debt benefits from accruals quality. Including both interaction terms 
simultaneously does not significantly change the results. 
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Table 7: Adjusted cost of debt 
 
 
   Dependent variable: COD_adj 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef. (t stat.) 
MAIN EFFECT             
 AQ  -0.0385*** (-2.83)   -0.0963*** (-2.83)   -0.0117 (-0.64)   -0.0691** (-1.96) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS             
 AQ * STRENGTH      0.0667*  (1.65)         0.0806**  (1.98) 
 AQ * DURATION        -0.0117** (-2.23)   -0.0136** (-2.58) 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS          
 STRENGTH  -0.5101*** (-3.06)   -0.9249*** (-3.06)   -0.5410*** (-3.57)   -0.9957*** (-3.27) 
 DURATION   0.0062  (0.22)    0.0062  (0.22)    0.0693  (1.62)    0.0805*  (1.87) 
OTHER CONTROLS            
 LEVERAGE   0.3033  (1.20)    0.3033  (1.20)    0.3170  (1.26)    0.3101  (1.23) 
 LNASSETS  -0.1948*** (-3.64)   -0.1948*** (-3.64)   -0.1933*** (-3.62)   -0.1928*** (-3.62) 
 ROA  -2.2244*** (-5.50)   -2.2244*** (-5.50)   -2.2503*** (-5.55)   -2.2497*** (-5.56) 
 COVRATIO   0.0615***  (3.71)    0.0615***  (3.71)    0.0609***  (3.69)    0.0617***  (3.74) 
 σ(NIBE)   0.1577  (0.12)    0.1577  (0.12)    0.2578  (0.20)    0.2739  (0.21) 
 SECURED   0.0734  (0.81)    0.0734  (0.81)    0.0743  (0.82)    0.0760  (0.84) 
CONSTANT   2.1891***  (3.09)    2.1891***  (3.09)    1.6831**  (2.52)    2.0048***  (2.88) 
                   
 N  10,024   10,024   10,024   10,024  
 Adj. R2  0.036     0.036     0.037     0.037  
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: The table reports pooled OLS estimates with robust standard errors which are clustered at the firm level. Dummies for year, industry and legal form are included, but not 
reported. T statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
The table shows the estimates for eq. (7) using adjusted cost of debt as dependent variable. Column 1 does not include any interaction term, Column 2 and 3 include only one 
interaction term, and Column 4 includes all interaction terms of the model. 
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2.6.2. Accruals quality proxies 
Next, we test the robustness of our findings for alternative accruals quality measures. We 
start with the measures of the unmodified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. It excludes 
property, plant and equipment, and change in revenue as independent variables. Total 
current accruals are only explained by past, present and future operational cash flows. To 
calculate accruals quality, we estimate eq. (8) for each of the 374 industry-year clusters: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, (8) 
where TCA=total current accruals, CFO=cash flow from operations, j=1,…,N 
firm index, and t=1,…,T year index. All variables of the regression are divided by average 
total assets. The detailed description of all variables is reported in Table 1. 
The residuals of the estimated eq. (8) represent the abnormal accruals. The first 
additional proxy of accruals quality is defined as: AQ(sdDD)j,t=[-σ(εt)j,t]DECILE36, where 
larger values of AQ(sdDD)j,t represent better accruals quality.  
Another possibility to modify the measure of Dechow and Dichev is a version by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006). This model integrates the asymmetry in gain and loss 
recognition as additional control variables into the following regression model: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 
(9) 
 + 𝛼4∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐷𝑗,𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, 
where TCA=total current accruals, CFO=cash flow from operations, 
ΔCFO=change in cash flow from operations, D=dummy equal one if ∆CFO<0, j=1,…,N 
firm index, and t=1,…,T year index. All continuous variables of the regression are divided 
by average total assets. The detailed description of all variables is reported in Table 1. 
We define the second additional accruals quality proxy as: AQ(sdBS)j,t=[-
σ(εt)j,t]DECILE37. A third method to identify accruals quality relies on Jones (1991) who 
predicts the level of normal accruals in the first step and measures the level of abnormal 
accruals afterwards. In the Jones model, normal accruals are explained only by the change 
                                                 
36 The approach is analogous to the procedure described before (see Section 2.3.2). 
37 In unreported tests, we calculate accruals quality using negative values of the absolute residuals, i.e. -|εj,t|, 
instead of the rolling std. dev. from the three perspective models. The resulting three measures are 
AQ(McN)j,t for eq. (2), AQ(DD)j,t, for eq. (8), and AQ(BS)j,t, for eq. (9) where higher values represent 
better accruals quality. The effects on cost of debt remain similar. 
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in revenue (ΔRev) and property, plant and equipment (PPE). The unexplained part of the 
regression estimation represents the abnormal accruals.To calculate accruals quality, we 
estimate eq. (10) for each of the 374 industry-year clusters: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
= 𝛾1 + 𝛾2
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝜂𝑗,𝑡, (10) 
where TAj,t = total accruals, ∆Revj,t= revenue, PPEj,t= gross
38 value of property, plant 
and equipment. All variables are divided by lagged total assets (Assetj,t−1). The firm-
specific normal accruals are defined as fitted values based on the coefficients estimates: 
𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
, (11) 
where NAj,t = normal level of accruals.The abnormal level of accruals is measured as the 
difference between realized total accruals and estimated normal accruals: AAj,t =
TAj,t
Assetj,t−1
− NAj,t. To proxy for accruals quality, we use the negative value of the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals: AQ(J)j,t = −|AA|j,t , where larger values of −|AA|j,t 
represent better accruals quality. In the regression analysis we use again decile ranks by 
year: AQ(J)j,t=[−|𝐴𝐴|𝑗,𝑡]DECILE.The last proxy is the modification of the previous Jones 
model by Dechow et al. (1995). They subtract accounts receivables from revenue to 
control for potential earnings management that aims to increase revenue by overstating 
accounts receivables. Thus, the firm-specific normal accruals are calculated as follows: 
𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
, (12) 
where NAj,t = normal level of accruals, ∆ARj,t = change in accounts receivable. Finally, 
the abnormal level of accruals is again calculated as the difference between realized total 
accruals and estimated normal accruals: AAj,t =
TAj,t
Assetj,t−1
− NAj,t . The last accruals 
quality proxy is defined as: AQ(J)j,t=[−|𝐴𝐴|𝑗,𝑡]DECILE.  
                                                 
38 Note that the Jones (1991) model requires gross values of property, plant and equipment and accordingly 
we use gross PPE. Net PPE equals gross PPE minus accumulated depreciation. Culvenor and Godfrey 
(1999) show that using net PPE in the Jones model provides also reliable results.  
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Table 8: Accruals quality proxies 
 
 
   AQ(sdDD)  AQ(sdBS)  AQ(J)  AQ(mJ) 
   Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef. (t stat.)  Coef.   (t stat.) 
MAIN EFFECT             
 AQ(PROXY)  -0.1064***   (-2.95)   -0.0727**   (-2.01)   -0.0433*   (-1.71)   -0.0460*   (-1.82) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS                 
 AQ(PROXY) * STRENGTH  0.1252***    (2.98)    0.0981**    (2.35)    0.0542*    (1.78)    0.0570*    (1.86) 
 AQ(PROXY) * DURATION -0.0121**   (-2.30)   -0.0160***   (-2.93)   -0.0079*   (-1.81)   -0.0077*   (-1.74) 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS                
 STRENGTH  -1.3407***   (-4.27)   -1.1850***   (-3.79)   -0.9249***   (-3.75)   -0.9398***   (-3.78) 
 DURATION   0.0675    (1.56)    0.0883**    (1.97)    0.0422    (1.08)    0.0407    (1.04) 
OTHER CONTROLS            
 LEVERAGE   0.1787    (0.67)    0.1757    (0.66)    0.1740    (0.65)    0.1740    (0.65) 
 LNASSETS  -0.2185***   (-4.03)   -0.2162***   (-3.99)   -0.2293***   (-4.24)   -0.2292***   (-4.24) 
 ROA  -2.5541***   (-5.92)   -2.5671***   (-5.93)   -2.6164***   (-6.04)   -2.6179***   (-6.05) 
 COVRATIO   0.0630***    (3.81)    0.0635***    (3.82)    0.0618***    (3.68)    0.0618***    (3.68) 
 σ(NIBE)   0.1217    (0.09)    0.3335    (0.24)    1.7485    (1.37)    1.7485    (1.37) 
 ASSOCIATE  -2.7394***   (-9.51)   -2.7427***   (-9.47)   -2.7180***   (-9.33)   -2.7172***   (-9.33) 
 OWNER  -2.1659*** (-10.26)   -2.1653*** (-10.25)   -2.1379*** (-10.11)   -2.1379*** (-10.11) 
 PENSION  -5.1612*** (-13.37)   -5.1776*** (-13.44)   -5.1411*** (-13.38)   -5.1419*** (-13.38) 
 SECURED   0.1024    (1.09)    0.1015    (1.09)    0.0861    (0.91)    0.0857    (0.91) 
CONSTANT   8.2008***  (11.48)    7.9754***  (11.21)    7.8627***  (11.06)    7.8763***  (11.06) 
                  
 N  10,024   10,024   10,024   10,024  
 Adj. R2  0.159   0.159   0.156   0.156  
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: The table reports pooled OLS estimates with robust standard errors which are clustered at the firm level. Dummies for year, industry and legal form are included, but not 
reported. T statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in Table 1. The table shows estimates for eq. (5) 
with all interaction terms for different accruals quality proxies. The depedent variable is COD. The used AQ(PROXY) is outlined in the header of each column. 
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Table 8 reports in Column 1-4 the estimates of eq. (5) for the four previous explained 
accruals quality proxies. The estimated coefficients of AQ(PROXY) have the predicted signs 
and are all significant. The same holds for both interaction terms (relationship strength and 
relationship duration with accruals quality). Therefore, changing the definition of accruals 
quality does not change our main results. 
2.6.3. Relationship strength proxies 
Finally, we introduce three variables to scale relationship strength. 
The first is a dummy, which differentiates only between low and high relationship 
strength. We transform the continuous relationship measure (STRENGTH) used in our main 
analysis in eq. (3) into a dummy indicating high relationship strength if the relationship 
strength is higher than a chosen threshold (Stein 2015). We define this threshold as the 
sample’s median relationship strength as shown in the eq. (13): 
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻(𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 50%)𝑗,𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑗,𝑡 
(13) 
 > 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒′𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻, 
where STRENGTH=loans from main lender divided by loans from all lenders as defined in 
eq. (3). 
Until now, we focused only on the main lender. The second and third additional 
proxies consider the relationship with all lenders. We are able to calculate these measures, 
since the MiMiK dataset includes quarterly loan amounts between a particular lender and 
borrower39. A firm can have loans from more than one lender per quarter. We use the number 
of lenders a firm has in a particular year, the annual main lender and the loan amounts of 
each lender to calculate our next two relationship strength proxies.  
The second proxy measures relationship strength as a firm’s borrowing concentration 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hirschman 1964), computed as follows40: 
                                                 
39 Hence, we get needed relationship data for each firm on an annual level and therefore convert the dataset from 
quarterly into annual data. We start with 1,520,191 quarterly firm-lender loan amount data and get the final 
sample of 10,024 firm-years for 2,159 firms from 2002-2008. 
40 In unreported regressions, we also use a dummy variable based on HHI. The dummy indicates high borrowing 
concentration when a firm’s HHI is higher than a certain threshold. For example, when we use a threshold 
which equals the sample’s median HHI (HHIHIGH(50%)) the results remain similar. 
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𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻(𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝑗,𝑡 = [∑(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖)
2
𝐿
𝑖=1
]
𝑗,𝑡
 (14) 
where STRENGTH(HHI)=borrowers’ concentration index, LoanShare=loan share of lender 
i defined as LoanSharei=LoanLenderi/LoanALender, LoanLenderi=loan of lender i, 
LoanALender=loan from all lenders, L=number of lenders, j=1,…,N firm index, and 
t=1,…,T year index. The HHI is obtained for every firm and year.  
Finally, the third proxy counts the number of lenders a firm has in the perspective 
year. Since the number of lenders is an inverse measure of relationship strength, we define 
the variable in the following way: 
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇)𝑗,𝑡 = −(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑗,𝑡, (15) 
where STRENGTH(COUNT)=negative value of the number of lenders, , j=1,…,N firm index, 
and t=1,…,T year index. In summary, all relationship strength measures we introduced in 
this section are expected to have a decreasing effect on cost of debt. 
Table 9 shows the results for all relationship strength proxies. We find significantly 
positive coefficient estimates for the AQ*STRENGTH(PROXY) interaction term in all three 
columns. The opposite coefficient of the interaction term compared to the sole coefficient of 
accruals quality indicates that relationship strength moderates the effect of accruals quality 
on cost of debt.  
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Table 9: Relationship strength proxies 
 
 
   STRENGTH(HIGH 50%)  STRENGTH(HHI)  STRENGTH(COUNT) 
   Coef.      (t stat.)  Coef.   (t stat.)  Coef. (t stat.) 
MAIN EFFECT          
 AQ  -0.0148   (-0.71)   -0.0571*   (-1.82)    0.0449*    (1.91) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS              
 AQ * STRENGTH(PROXY)   0.0365*    (1.85)    0.0841**    (2.33)    0.0176***    (2.67) 
 AQ * DURATION  -0.0158***   (-2.87)   -0.0161***   (-2.94)   -0.0165***   (-3.05) 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS            
 STRENGTH(PROXY)  -0.3982***   (-2.88)   -1.0167***   (-3.79)   -0.2024***   (-3.95) 
 DURATION   0.0679    (1.52)    0.0857*    (1.92)    0.0796*    (1.84) 
OTHER CONTROLS         
 LEVERAGE   0.1943    (0.73)    0.1761    (0.66)    0.1934    (0.73) 
 LNASSETS  -0.1809***   (-3.49)   -0.2194***   (-4.05)   -0.2259***   (-4.16) 
 ROA  -2.5599***   (-5.88)   -2.5594***   (-5.9)   -2.5170***   (-5.79) 
 COVRATIO   0.0630***    (3.79)    0.0635***    (3.83)    0.0635***    (3.86) 
 σ(NIBE)   0.3064    (0.22)    0.3156    (0.23)    0.2911    (0.21) 
 ASSOCIATE  -2.7560***   (-9.46)   -2.7552***   (-9.52)   -2.8408***   (-9.89) 
 OWNER  -2.1964*** (-10.37)   -2.1676*** (-10.26)   -2.1836*** (-10.37) 
 PENSION  -5.2243*** (-13.60)   -5.1714*** (-13.42)   -5.1633*** (-13.38) 
 SECURED   0.0936    (1.00)    0.1024    (1.10)    0.1092    (1.17) 
CONSTANT   6.9429***  (11.12)    7.8205***  (11.40)    6.6908***  (10.58) 
              
 N  10,024     10,024     10,024  
 Adj. R2  0.156     0.159     0.160  
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: The table reports pooled OLS estimates with robust standard errors which are clustered at the firm level. Dummies for year, industry and legal form are included, but not 
reported. T statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in Table 1. The table shows the estimates for eq. 
(5) with all interaction terms for different accruals quality, relationship strength, and relationship duration proxies. The depedent variable is COD. The used STRENGTH(PROXY) 
is outlined in the header of each column. 
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2.6.4. Relationship duration proxies 
In addition to various measures for relationship strength, we use three different measures 
for relationship duration. The first and second additional proxy is a dummy, which 
differentiates only between low and high relationship duration. The dummy variable 
reveals high relationship duration when firm’s relationship duration from the main 
analysis is higher than a chosen threshold (Stein 2015). We define this threshold as the 
sample’s median and 75th percentile of relationship duration as shown in eq. (16): 
𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁(𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 50%)𝑗,𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 (16) 
 > 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠′𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁,  
and in eq. (17): 
𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁(𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 75%) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 (17) 
 > 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠′75𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒,  
where DURATION=number of subsequent years with the same main lender. The samples’ 
median relationship duration equals 2 years and the 75th percentile equals 4 years. The 
third additional proxy is the natural logarithm of relationship duration: 
𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁(𝐿𝑁)𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡, (18) 
where DURATION=number of subsequent years with the same main lender.  
Table 10, Column 1-3, shows the estimation of eq. (5) for all three relationship 
duration proxies. We find significantly negative coefficient estimates for the 
AQ*DURATION(PROXY) interaction term in all three columns.  
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Table 10: Relationship duration proxies 
 
 
   DURATION(HIGH 50%)  DURATION(HIGH 75%)  DURATION(LN) 
   Coef.      (t stat.)  Coef.     (t stat.)  Coef.    (t stat.) 
MAIN EFFECT          
 AQ  -0.0948***   (-2.69)   -0.1012***   (-2.90)   -0.0471   (-1.19) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS              
 AQ * STRENGTH   0.0907**    (2.19)    0.0942**    (2.27)    0.0971**    (2.33) 
 AQ * DURATION(PROXY)  -0.0344**   (-2.21)   -0.0701***   (-3.33)   -0.0560***   (-2.85) 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING CONTROLS            
 STRENGTH  -1.1420***   (-3.68)   -1.1554***   (-3.73)   -1.1863***   (-3.79) 
 DURATION(PROXY)   0.1786    (1.49)    0.3577**    (2.17)    0.3232**    (2.01) 
OTHER CONTROLS         
 LEVERAGE   0.1748    (0.65)    0.1763    (0.66)    0.1741    (0.65) 
 LNASSETS  -0.2164***   (-3.99)   -0.2170***   (-4.01)   -0.2165***   (-3.99) 
 ROA  -2.5567***   (-5.90)   -2.5583***   (-5.92)   -2.5650***   (-5.92) 
 COVRATIO   0.0633***    (3.80)    0.0638***    (3.84)    0.0634***    (3.82) 
 σ(NIBE)   0.2577    (0.19)    0.3418    (0.25)    0.3149    (0.23) 
 ASSOCIATE  -2.7483***   (-9.50)   -2.7496***   (-9.49)   -2.7417***   (-9.47) 
 OWNER  -2.1683*** (-10.26)   -2.1658*** (-10.25)   -2.1652*** (-10.25) 
 PENSION  -5.1792*** (-13.44)   -5.1690*** (-13.43)   -5.1782*** (-13.45) 
 SECURED   0.1007    (1.08)    0.0992    (1.06)    0.1017    (1.09) 
CONSTANT   8.1033***  (11.29)    8.1274***  (11.30)    7.8350***  (11.08) 
              
 N  10,024     10,024     10,024  
 Adj. R2  0.158     0.159     0.159  
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 1997-2008, MiMiK, 2002-2008, own calculations. 
Notes: The table reports pooled OLS estimates with robust standard errors which are clustered at the firm level. Dummies for year, industry and legal form are included, but not 
reported. T statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All variables are defined in Table 1. The table shows the estimates for eq. 
(5) with all interaction terms for different relationship duration proxies. The depedent variable is COD. The used DURATION(PROXY) is outlined in the header of each column. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
This paper deals with the question how accounting information and relationship lending 
interact in reducing information asymmetry between lender and borrower. We find that 
the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt decreases if the firm borrows more money 
from one bank. Thus, the bank uses an additional private information channel and accruals 
quality is less important. However, we also find that a longer relationship and therefore 
repeated interaction with the firm can lead to bank’s learning to interpret accruals quality 
better which manifests itself through a higher cost of debt benefit of accruals quality for 
firms with longer relationships. 
We use two unique datasets of Deutsche Bundesbank and find that higher accruals 
quality of German SMEs leads on average to an interest rate benefit of 32.96 basis points. 
This benefit significantly differs between firms with low and high relationship strength. 
Better accruals quality leads to a 56.82 (18.32) basis points lower cost of debt for firms 
with low (high) relationship strength. The findings suggest that main lenders have an 
incentive to acquire private information and to monitor firms if they are the exclusive 
lender of the firm. According to this, they focus on relationship lending and less on 
accounting based lending. However, in the long run, accruals quality gains relatively more 
importance. Thus, the results confirm that firms with longer relationships get 4.3 times 
higher cost of debt benefits from accruals quality. One possible explanation is that longer 
relationships lead to a data history. Then, banks tend to interpret accruals quality better. 
The outcome of this study is relevant for firms and the accounting literature. First, 
our results are important for firms, since they show when banks use accruals quality in 
assessing firms' cost of debt. Better accruals quality leads to the highest cost of debt 
benefits if the firm has more than one lender (a lender portfolio) and if the firm keeps this 
portfolio for a long time. Second, we contribute to the accounting literature in pointing 
out that accruals quality is important in a strong relationship lending setting and that there 
are relationship lending dimensions which increase the importance of accruals quality.  
Our study has two important limitations. First, the sample includes only 
information on relatively large loans. This might lead to a higher fraction of relatively 
large firms compared to the total population of German SMEs. Second, our study may 
 49 
 
suffer from endogeneity problems of accruals quality and relationship lending. Firm’s 
accounting choices might be driven, for example, by tax and dividend choices (Bigus et 
al. 2015; Szczesny and Valentincic 2013) or by relationship lending (Bigus and 
Hillebrand 2016). Furthermore, relationship lending may also be endogenous, since 
firm’s decision to focus on a main lender can be determined by different firm 
characteristics (Bharath et al. 2011; Bigus and Hillebrand 2016). We do not provide 
solutions to these endogeneity issues since we do not have appropriate instrumental 
variables. 
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3. What happens if private accounting information becomes public?  
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of accounting disclosure on access to bank debt. The 
main aim is to show that once private firms’ accounting information becomes publicly 
available it leads to higher access to bank debt. The following analyses are conducted as 
part of the research project "The role of mandatory public disclosure in the access to bank 
debt" using the research place and databases of Deutsche Bundesbank 41 . The views 
expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives an introduction. Section 
3.2 presents the institutional setting and research question. Section 3.3 discusses 
methodology and data. Section 3.4 presents results and Section 3.5. robustness checks. 
Section 3.6 shows the additional analysis. Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.1. Introduction 
The banking literature conjectures that relationship banks obtain an informational 
advantage over their competitors through private information about their clients (e.g., 
Boot 2000; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000). On the one hand, this might result in 
information rents for the incumbent bank (i.e., the “hold up”-problem). On the other hand, 
firms engaged in relationship lending might receive debt funding solely based on private 
information collected by their housebank. Moreover, there is the intermediate position 
that firms and incumbent banks might share the information rent associated with non-
disclosure (Breuer et al. 2016). We examine the effects of a sudden external shock in 
public financial statement disclosure on firms’ access to debt. As such, we exploit a 
regulatory change (in our case a move from private to public accounting information) as 
a quasi-natural experiment. The act about electronic trade registers and cooperative 
registers as well as the company register (EHUG) requires private companies to publish 
                                                 
41 The paper version of this study is co-authored with Carsten Homburg (University of Cologne) and 
Thomas Loy (University of Bayreuth). 
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their financial statements mandatorily in the electronic federal gazette (i.e., the 
“eBundesanzeiger”, similar to SEC EDGAR in the US) from 2006 onwards. Therefore, 
financial statements that the incumbent bank as well as a select group of stakeholders 
(e.g., minority owners, tax offices) received privately before 2006 became public 
information going forward. Before the regulatory change, enforcement of the already 
existing rules was rather weak. This weak enforcement environment resulted in a quasi-
voluntary42 publication of private firms’ financial statements. After tightening regulation 
and enforcement, coverage in the electronic federal gazette increased tremendously over 
a short period to almost complete (e.g., Achleitner et al. 2011). 
We contribute to the literature in multiple ways. Traditionally, researchers focused 
on voluntary disclosure and audit and its effects on access to credit and/or credit terms. 
As such, Minnis (2011) shows that private US firms benefit from lower interest rates after 
voluntarily obtaining financial statement verification. Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2015) 
use loan applications of small firms to a large bank and find that the (voluntary) 
availability of financial statement disclosures increases their access to bank debt. 
Similarly, Bird et al. (2016) show that voluntary disclosure of key financial ratios reduces 
financing costs and increases the amount of subsequent debt and equity issues. Along the 
same lines, Balsmeier and Vanhaverbeke (2016) exhibit that the propensity of foreign 
banks providing loans is positively associated to voluntary IFRS adoption by private 
firms. Our dataset includes financial statements that borrowers privately shared with their 
bank, and which the firm had to pass on confidentially to the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(German Central Bank) for trade bill refinancing purposes (Stöss 2001). Neither the firm, 
nor the bank or the central bank ever publicly disclosed the respective financial 
statements. In contrast to the publicly available electronic federal gazette or commercial 
databases with private firm information (such as Amadeus), the dataset of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (USTAN) includes (1) both types of firms - with and without the obligation 
to disclose financial statements and (2) during both periods (i.e., pre- and post-increased 
disclosure enforcement regulation). After aforementioned enforcement act, the same 
                                                 
42 Already since 2003, private German firms that exceed certain size thresholds would have had to publish 
their financial statements in the electronic federal gazette. 
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firms had to publicly disclose their financial statements. Thus, our setting alleviates 
severe self-selection concerns with respect to discretionary accounting disclosure choices 
prevalent in the private firm lending literature (for an in-depth discussion of self-selection 
and private firm financing, cf. Cassar 2011). 
Second, we expand on prior research into the nexus of German private firm 
disclosure and bank relationships, which exploits the different disclosure thresholds in 
the German law (Breuer et al. 2016). Firms classified as “small” must only disclose a 
balance sheet, while firms classified as “medium” must disclose additional items, such as 
a management report with forward looking and risk disclosures, as well as an income 
statement.43 While small firms still need to create an income statement to prepare a proper 
balance sheet, only medium-sized firms need to disclose this valuable piece of 
information. Therefore, both types of firms only differ in terms of disclosure but not in 
terms of internal information gathering. Breuer et al. (2016) show in a regression 
discontinuity design that medium-sized firms’ just slightly above the threshold disclose 
almost double the amount of information compared to small firms slightly below the 
threshold. Moreover, they show that banks access the publicly available files in the 
electronic federal gazette significantly more often if the firm is subject to the additional 
disclosure requirement and that there is substantially more bank competition for these 
medium-sized clients - although they are just slightly larger in terms of actual firm size. 
Our setting adds to these findings, as we are able to use aforementioned confidential 
Deutsche Bundesbank dataset, which includes unpublished financial statements before 
increased disclosure enforcement. Thus, we can show the effect of public disclosure on 
banking through an external enforcement shock, rather than a regression discontinuity 
design which is based on additional, rather restrictive, assumptions. The most important 
being that the treatment is assigned “as good as randomized” (Lee 2008, 676) and, thus, 
not under managerial discretion. Nevertheless, there is evidence of firms’ size 
management to deliberately remain below the disclosure threshold (Bernard et al. 2015). 
                                                 
43 For a detailed overview of the applicable size thresholds of German Commercial Code (Section 267), see 
Table 11. 
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Our results indicate that increased financial statement publicity leads to 
significantly increased firm access to bank debt (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Access to bank debt for treatment and control firms in the pre- and 
post-enforcement periods 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
 
Panel B: Matched sample 
 
 
 
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: In the above figure the x-axis represents time and the y-axis represents FACCESS. The exact values 
of the graphical difference-in-difference analysis are displayed in Table 17. 
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This might either be a result of the inside lender expanding its engagement in the firm to 
fend off new lenders, or new lenders granting loans as their information asymmetry, 
compared to inside lenders, decreases. To alleviate concerns that the control group firms’ 
characteristics might drive the result rather than the disclosure shock, we employ a 
matching procedure to create a comparable control group of firms, not subject to financial 
statement disclosure, neither before nor after the shock. 
 
3.2. Institutional background and research question 
3.2.1. The switch from private to public accounting information in Germany 
Since 2003, German corporations have to publicly disclose their financial statements in 
the electronic federal gazette.44 Before 2006, only about 5% of the firms, which are 
subject to the disclosure rules, actually published their financial statements. With the 
introduction of EHUG, coverage increased to almost complete. Unwilling firms face 
monitoring by the Federal Department of Justice as well as severe penalties for both firms’ 
and their managers, alike (Achleitner et al. 2011). Hence, prior to 2006 firms de facto 
prepared financial statements only for a small set of stakeholders, including owners and 
existing lenders. Since then, these financial statements became public information for 
everyone to look up on the internet – even free of charge.45 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, firms have up to one year to comply with the 
financial statement disclosure requirement. Since most firms make use of the full time 
available to disclose (Wittmann and Bravidor 2015), the 2006 financial statements will 
be publicly available towards the end of 2007. All potential effects of disclosure on access 
to bank debt are then recognizable in the 2008 financial statements. 
 
 
  
                                                 
44 German Commercial Code (Section 325) defines mandatory disclosure for corporations. Private firms 
that are not corporations (i.e., unlimited liability firms) have to disclose according to the Public Disclosure 
Act (Section 9). 
45 The electronic federal gazette is available at www.bundesanzeiger.de. 
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Figure 2: The switch from private to public accounting information in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis represents time and the y-axis represents the treatment and control sample. The dashed 
line shows firms which voluntarily publicly disclose accounting information when it is not legally 
required. The solid line represents firms disclosing accounting information after it is mandatory 
following the EHUG enforcement shock. Our treatment sample consists of limited liability firms that 
have to publicly disclose due to the EHUG enforcement. The law defines that small limited liability firms 
have to disclose their balance sheet only, whereas middle-sized and large limited liability firms have to 
disclose their balance sheet as well as their profit and loss statement (see Table 11 for a formal definition 
of small, medium-sized, and large firms). The control sample are unlimited liability firms that are not 
subject to this regulation. Following the EHUG enforcement effort, firms have to mandatorily disclose 
beginning with the financial statement of 31/12/2006, but the firms have one year to actually disclose, 
and the overwhelming majority take advantage of this rule (Wittmann and Bravidor 2015). 
 
 
The obligation to disclose financial statements depends on the private firm’s 
liability status as well as a range of size criteria. Limited liability firms (i.e. corporations) 
are in general subject to EHUG disclosure (German Commercial Code, Section 325). 
However, there are especially high size-dependent reliefs for small limited liability firms. 
Small limited liability firms meeting at least two out of the three following criteria, for 
two subsequent years, have only to submit a balance sheet (German Commercial Code, 
Section 267): 1) total assets below € 4.015 mn, 2) sales below € 8.030 mn, and 3) less 
than 50 employees46. 
  
                                                 
46 Firms had to apply these criteria for the period between 2005 and 2009. Table 1 shows in addition criteria 
for the period between 2000 and 2001 and between 2002 and 2004. The criteria were slightly changed 
from period to period due to inflationary adjustments. 
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Table 11: Public disclosure requirements and size thresholds for limited liability 
firms 
    
    
 Public disclosure Size threshold 
 
Balance 
sheet 
P&L 
statement 2000-2001 2002-2004 2005-2009 
Small limited liability firm Yes No    
Total assets (€ mn)   ≤3.438 ≤3.438 ≤4.015 
Sales (€ mn)   ≤6.875 ≤6.875 ≤8.030 
Employees   ≤50 ≤50 ≤50 
Medium sized limited 
liability firm Yes Yes    
Total assets (€ mn)   ≤13.750 ≤13.750 ≤16.060 
Sales (€ mn)   ≤27.500 ≤27.500 ≤32.120 
Employees   ≤250 ≤250 ≤250 
Large limited liability firm Yes Yes    
Total assets (€ mn)   >13.749 >13.750 >16.060 
Sales (€ mn)   >27.497 >27.500 >32.120 
Employees   >250 >250 >250 
    
Notes: The table shows public disclosure requirements for small, medium-sized, and large limited liability 
firms. Limited liability firms have to meet two out of the three size thresholds for two subsequent years to 
be classified as small, medium-sized, or large. The size thresholds are defined in the German Commercial 
Code (Section 267). 
 
 
Unlimited liability firms, such as partnerships and one-person businesses, are 
principally not subject to EHUG disclosure, except if being large. Thus, large unlimited 
liability firms are meeting a considerably high disclosure threshold, which also consists 
of three criteria out of which two have to be met for three consecutive years (Public 
Disclosure Act, Section 1): 1) total assets over € 65 mn, 2) sales over € 130 mn, and 3) 
more than 5,000 employees. We exclude large unlimited liability firms surpassing the 
aforementioned threshold. Hence, unlimited liability firms, which remain in our sample, 
are not subject to mandatory financial statement disclosure. Therefore, we employ this 
particular difference in the disclosure requirements between limited and unlimited 
liability firms to test for effects of the enforcement shock. Furthermore, to ensure 
comparability between treatment and control groups, we use a matching procedure. Post-
matching both groups are closely similar in a wide range of firm characteristics (e.g., size, 
profitability, probability of default, sales growth), except for the disclosure requirement. 
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3.2.2. Accounting information and access to bank debt 
Empirical evidence shows that (the quality of) accounting information influences firms’ 
choice of debt (public vs. private, Bharath et al. 2008), firms’ access to bank debt 
(Agarwal et al. 2015; García-Teruel et al. 2014) as well as credit terms (e.g., Minnis 2011). 
Banks use covenants based on financial statement information (i.e., arm’s length lending) 
and additional private information (i.e., relationship lending) to reduce information 
asymmetries in (private) firm initial lending decisions and ex-post monitoring (Berger 
and Udell 1995; Bharath et al. 2008; Jiangli et al. 2008; Petersen and Rajan 1994). Yet, 
it is difficult to disentangle the particular role of each information source for existing 
borrowers. However, Danos et al. (1989) show that accounting information is particularly 
valuable in evaluating new borrowers. 
Like other European economies, Germany is well known for strong relationship 
lending and widespread and longstanding housebank relationships. Especially private 
firms have little economically meaningful alternatives to bank financing (Alonso et al. 
2005; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Machauer and Weber 1998). 
Banks aim to be the firm’s exclusive lender (Diamond 1984) and have an incentive that 
firms obfuscate their financial statements through earnings management (Bigus and 
Hillebrand 2016; García-Teruel et al. 2014). Furthermore, firms might also have 
incentives to share their financial statements with the lowest possible number of 
stakeholders, attributable to proprietary costs of public disclosure. For instance, they want 
their profit margins to remain hidden to (potential) competitors (Bernard et al. 2015). 
In the spirit of Easley and O'Hara (2004), we define accounting information which 
is shared only with the inside lender as private accounting information. When a firm 
publicly discloses its financial statement in the electronic federal gazette, outside lenders 
obtain first insights into its financial position and profitability. As such, formerly private 
accounting information becomes public. Contrary to inside lenders, (potential) outside 
lenders generally do not possess additional, private information about the firm. As a result, 
publicly available accounting information decreases information asymmetries between 
inside and outside lenders (Ball et al. 2008; Kim, Tsui et al. 2011). Decreased information 
asymmetry results in two possible outcomes. First, the outside lender takes chance of the 
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new publicly available accounting information, contacts the firm and offers (additional) 
bank debt. Second, the inside lender uses its more advantageous lending position and 
offers the firm additional loans to keep competing lenders at bay. However, once private 
accounting information becomes public, it likely results in more access to bank debt for 
the firm, either from inside or outside lenders. 
3.3. Data, model, and variables 
3.3.1. Data  
We use the Unternehmensbilanzstatistiken (USTAN47) from the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(German Central Bank). USTAN contains both types of firms, with and without the 
obligation to disclose financial statements (i.e., limited liability private firms above and 
below aforementioned disclosure threshold as well as unlimited liability firms not subject 
to disclosure). This database originates from Bundesbank’s refinancing activities (Stöss 
2001) and is composed almost entirely of standardized nonconsolidated ﬁnancial 
statements of German private ﬁrms. It is available on-site and in an anonymized version. 
Furthermore, to control for firms, which voluntarily disclose before stricter EHUG 
enforcement, we use a match of USTAN and Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database.48 
   
  
                                                 
47 The digital object identifier (DOI) for this dataset is 10.12757/Bbk.Ustan.9915.02.02. 
48 For the detailed methodology, cf., Schild et al. (2017). 
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Table 12: Sample selection, treatment, and control samples 
    
    
Panel A: Sample selection  
 Firm-year 
 observations 
Initial sample (1990-2014) 1,074,401 
  
Less:  
1. Quoted Firms and firm-years with bonds outstanding  
2. Firms from the financial services industry  
3. Firm-years with consolidated, IFRS or US-GAAP financial statements  
4. Firm-year with opening balances  
5. Firm-years with missing industry classifications  
6. Firms which change legal form  
7. Missing data for the calculation of variables and missing forward data 
required by our models 
 
8. Small firms with total assets less than €1 mn  
9. Unlimited liability firms meeting the criteria of the Public Disclosure Act  
10. Firms which appear only in the pre EHUG period or only in the post EHUG 
period 
 
11. Firm-years before 2004 or after 2009  
   
Full sample (2004-2009) 48,623 
  
Panel B: Treatment and control samples  
 Firm-year 
 observations 
1) Full sample (without matching) 48,623 
 Treatment: limited liability firms 44,083 
 Control: unlimited liability firms 4,540 
  
2) Treatment firms matched with unlimited liability firms 6,278 
 Treatment: limited liability firms 3,139 
 Control: unlimited liability firms 3,139 
    
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, own 
calculations. 
Notes: Panel A shows the sample selection to get the full sample of treatment and control firms. Panel B 
shows two different treatment and control samples: 1) full sample (total number of treatment and control 
firms without matching procedure) and 2) treatment firms matched with control firms. 
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The initial sample includes 1,074,401 firm-year observations from 1990 to 2014. 
We limit our sample to non-financial private firms between 2004 and 2009. As such, we 
drop listed firms and financial services firms. Furthermore, we eliminate unlimited 
liability firms, which have to disclose accounting information according to Section 1 of 
the Public Disclosure Act, which entail a significantly higher disclosure threshold, as 
stated before. In line with literature, we also drop firms with total assets below €1 mn to 
ensure that our results are not driven by extremely small firms (Bernard et al. 2015; Hope 
et al. 2013). We restrict the pre-regulation (2004-2006) and post-regulation (2007-2009) 
period to three years each, to limit the effect of other factors essentially unrelated to 
EHUG’s disclosure enforcement effort (Ahmed et al. 2013). Finally, we keep firm-years 
without missing values to calculate our models, with unconsolidated, local GAAP 
financial statements. The resulting final sample includes 48,623 (9,476) firm-year (firm) 
observations from 2004 to 2009. 
3.3.2. Model specification 
We employ a difference-in-difference design to estimate the effect of the EHUG public 
disclosure enforcement initiative on firms’ access to bank debt. The following regression 
is estimated with fixed effects and robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level49 
(Petersen 2009): 
𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑗,𝑡 
(19)  +𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑍_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6GROWTHj,t + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑗,𝑡 
 +𝛽8𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡, 
where j=1,…,N is the firm index, and t=1,…,T is the year index, y represents a vector of 
year indicators, while μ are firm indicators which control for unobservable characteristics 
that are constant over time. We measure access to bank debt (FACCESS), following 
García-Teruel et al. (2014), as total bank debt divided by total debt, which represents the 
part of debt financing obtained from banks. For our analysis, we use the one-year ahead 
                                                 
49 If we alternatively cluster at the year-level or employ two-way clustering at the year- and firm-level our 
results are qualitatively unchanged (untabulated). 
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values of access to bank defined as 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑗,𝑡 =  𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡+1/
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡+1. 
 We define our treatment firms (TREATMENT) and the time of the disclosure 
enforcement initiative (POST). The coefficient β1 on the interaction term 
(POST*TREATMENT) will show the effect of the EHUG disclosure enforcement on the 
treatment firms compared to the control firms not subject to public disclosure. The binary 
variable TREATMENT equals one (zero) if the firm is (not) subject to mandatory 
financial statement disclosure. The treatment ﬁrms have to make their financial 
statements publicly available in the online federal gazette. Those are limited liability firms, 
which meet two out of the following three criteria in two subsequent years: 1) assets above 
€ 4.015 mn, 2) sales above € 8.030 mn, and 3) more than 50 employees (German 
Commercial Code, Section 267)50 . The binary variable POST indicates the periods 
subject to public disclosure. The treatment firms are required to hand in their financial 
statements beginning with the year 2006. However, we define POST equal to one for 
fiscal year 2007 and subsequent periods, and zero otherwise. Our reasoning behind this 
is twofold. First, German private companies, in contrast to publicly listed stock 
corporations, have up to one year to disclose their financial statements to the public 
(German Commercial Code, Section 325). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the 
far overwhelming majority of German private companies takes advantage of this rule and 
does not choose to disclose early (Wittmann and Bravidor 2015). Therefore, the financial 
statements of Dec 31st 2006 will be publicly available to outside investors towards the 
end of 2007. Finally, as POST correlates with year-fixed effects and TREATMENT is 
part of the firm-fixed effects, both base line indicators are absorbed by the inclusion of 
these fixed effects. 
We also control for a range of additional firm characteristics which likely 
influence banks’ lending decisions (Cassar 2004; Cassar and Holmes 2003; García-Teruel 
et al. 2014; Heyman et al. 2008; Michaelas et al. 1999). These are firm size, measured as 
the logarithm of total assets, total leverage, measured as total liabilities over total assets, 
                                                 
50 The criteria are slightly different for the years between 2000 and 2004, due to inflationary adjustments. 
For a detailed overview, see Table 1. 
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return on assets, measured as earnings before interest and extraordinary items over total 
assets, probability of default (Altman Z-score), annual sales growth, and asset 
collateralizability, measured as tangible assets over total assets. Additionally, we control 
for (quasi-)voluntary 51  disclosure of financial statements before and additional 
disclosures above the legally required minimum after increased disclosure enforcement. 
We define all variables in Table 13. 
The predicted signs of the control variables size, probability of default, and 
profitability depends on the financial possibilities of the sample firms. Large and listed 
firms in a market-based system choose between public debt and bank debt. Larger size, 
lower probability of default and higher profitability will result in more public and less 
bank debt (Denis and Mihov 2003). In particular, size proxies for information asymmetry 
in the lending literature (Berger and Udell 1995; Diamond 1991; Petersen and Rajan 
1994). As the information environment generally improves with firm size, larger firms 
are subject to lower information asymmetry. However, the main financial sources for 
smaller, unlisted firms in a bank-based system are internal funds and bank debt (Alonso 
et al. 2005; García-Teruel et al. 2014). Germany is a bank based financial system and our 
sample consists of unlisted firms without bonds outstanding. As such, the main source for 
external financing is bank debt. Therefore, we expect a positive association between size 
and access to bank debt. Furthermore, the expected sign of probability of default depends 
also on the context. While, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that, in a market-based financial 
system, firms with higher probability of default choose more bank debt. However, García-
Teruel et al. (2014) show that in a bank-based economy where firms choose between 
internal funds and bank debt, solvency helps borrowers to solve moral hazard problems. 
Nonetheless, given low recovery rates in private firm lending, banks might be inclined to 
extend lines of credit if they believe a downturn is temporary. In summary, in our context, 
it is not clear how probability of default and access to bank debt are related. Traditionally, 
banking theory suggests that more profitable firms choose public over private debt to 
circumvent potential hold-up problems. However, profitable firms in in a bank based 
                                                 
51 As previously mentioned, the publication of financial statements is already required since 2003, but only 
strongly regulated since 2006. Thus, the period between 2003 and 2006 can be characterized as “quasi-
voluntary”. 
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system can use internal funds and do not need to raise additional bank debt (García-Teruel 
et al. 2014). Besides, the distribution of profits to owners might also result in banks 
demanding loan repayment to not increase their exposure to future downside risk. In sum, 
we expect that more profitability decreases future need for debt financing.  
There are also two opposing theories regarding the predicted sign on growth. On 
the one hand, growth can result in firms consuming all internal funds and asking for more 
bank debt (Michaelas et al. 1999). On the other hand, growth can increase uncertainty 
and firm exposure to demand fluctuations. Therefore, growing firms might be inclined to 
resort to more equity than debt financing (Heyman et al. 2008). In bank-based systems 
empirical results confirm the latter argument (Alonso et al. 2005; García-Teruel et al. 
2014; Heyman et al. 2008; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008). Furthermore, asset 
collateralizability should be positively related to bank debt. According to theory, 
collateral helps borrowers to decrease moral hazard (Boot and Thakor 1994), and there is 
no reason why this mechanism should depend on the concrete context. Additionally, 
higher total leverage might indicate higher financial risk which would normally imply 
less access to bank debt. On the other hand, there might be a positive spill-over between 
trade credit and bank financing (Cook 1999). And finally, bank financing and trade credit 
might even be totally independent as suppliers also accumulate considerable amounts of 
private information making their lending decision independent of any bank lending 
signals (Petersen and Rajan 1997). As such, we do not predict a sign on leverage. Finally, 
we also control for firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions before EHUG’s disclosure 
enforcement effort (Petersen and Rajan 1997). Voluntary disclosure generally leads to 
lower information asymmetry between inside and outside lenders and therefore to 
increased access to bank debt (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2015; Bird et al. 2016). However, if 
firms’ voluntarily disclose since a number of years, it is likely that now mandatory 
disclosure does not have an incremental effect. 
We test our research question by estimating the empirical model on the full sample 
and a matched sample. The full sample includes all treatment (limited liability) and 
control (unlimited liability) firms. It consists of 48,623 firm-year observations from 9,476 
individual firms, having the advantage of a fairly large sample size. However, the results 
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of difference-in-difference analyses of unmatched treatment and control firms could be 
biased as we compare firms of different sizes, and thus potential differences in political 
costs and public interest (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Therefore, we employ a matching 
procedure between limited and unlimited liability firms. We describe the matching 
between limited liability firms and their unlimited liability counterparts in the next section. 
Since our database includes only a small number of unlimited liability firms, we end up 
with a matched sample of 6,278 firm-year observations for 1,214 firms. Nevertheless, the 
advantage of this sample is high similarity of our treatment and control firms in terms of 
size, profitability and business model. 
 
Table 13: Variable definitions 
    
    
Variable Definition 
 
Dependent variable 
FACCESS One year ahead access to bank debt calculated as bank debt 
divided by interest bearing debt 
 
Variables of interest 
POST Binary indicator variable that equals 1 for ﬁrm-years ending on 
or after the EHUG introduction in 2007 (i.e. POST=1 if 
year>=2007) 
TREATMENT Binary indicator variable that equals one for ﬁrms which have to 
publicly disclose their financial statements (i.e., ﬁrms that have 
limited liability) 
 
Control variables 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities divided by total assets 
ROA Net income before interest and extraordinary items divided by 
total assets 
Z_SCORE Altman’s Z-Score computed as 1.2*(working capital/total assets) 
+ 1.4*(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3*(EBIT/Total Assets) 
+ 0.6*(Book value of equity/Book value of total liabilities) 
+ 1.0*(Sales/Total Assets) 
GROWTH Year-over-year growth in sales 
TANGIBLE Fixed assets divided by total assets 
 (Continued) 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
  
  
VOLUNTARY Binary indicator variable that equals one if firms publicly disclose 
their financial statements without any legal obligation to do so. 
In the pre-EHUG period, voluntary firms are limited or unlimited 
liability firms which publish their balance sheet or their balance 
sheet and profit and loss (P&L) statement. In the post-EHUG 
period, voluntary firms are unlimited liability firms, which publish 
anything (balance sheet or balance sheet in combination with the 
P&L statement), as well as small limited liability firms, which 
voluntarily publish their P&L statement. 
   
Robustness 
FACCESS2 One year ahead access to bank debt calculated as bank debt 
divided by total assets 
 
Additional analysis 
FMATURITY One year ahead maturity calculated as long-term debt divided by 
total debt (short-term and long-term) 
FCOD One year ahead cost of debt calculated as interest expense divided 
by interest bearing debt 
FSECURED One year ahead collateralized debt calculated as collateralized debt 
divided by interest bearing debt 
  
 
3.4. Main results 
3.4.1. Matching procedure 
We match treatment and control firms in the pre-regulation period. As such, we use 
propensity score matching to match firms according to the following continuous 
covariates (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2013), separately for each industry and pre-regulation year.52 
Specifically, we employ the averaged value of the covariates SIZE, LEVERAGE, ROA, 
Z_SCORE, GROWTH, and TANGIBLE from the pre-regulation period (2004-2006) and 
a logit regression to predict the propensity scores. Afterwards we employ nearest neighbor 
one-to-one matching with a caliper equaling 0.25 times standard deviation of the 
estimated propensity scores of the sample and without replacement (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1985). 
Table 14, Panel A (Panel B) shows the mean values of the matching variables 
before (after) matching. The matching process is effective as it balances all matching 
variables resulting in no significant post-matching differences in means. The standardized 
                                                 
52 Since we have an unbalanced dataset, we require matched firms to have the same number of observations. 
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bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) of the matching variables is below 10% in all cases 
which again shows that the treatment and control sample do not differ significantly. 
 
Table 14: Mean values of matching variables in the pre EHUG period  
                 (2004-2006) 
  
  
Panel A: Mean values of the matching variables before matching (N=23,958) 
Variables Control Treatment Diff %bias (t stat.) p value 
SIZE 8.343 9.172 -0.828  67.0 (27.46) 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE 0.721 0.755 -0.034  17.5   (8.67) 0.000*** 
ROA 0.079 0.065  0.014 -16.1 (-7.30) 0.000*** 
Z_SCORE 2.968 3.158 -0.190  10.7   (5.00) 0.000*** 
GROWTH 1.069 1.090 -0.021  10.1   (4.25) 0.000*** 
TANGIBLE 0.429 0.308  0.121 -44.7 (-20.61) 0.000*** 
      
Panel B: Mean values of the matching variables after matching (N=3,092) 
Variables Control Treatment Diff %bias (t stat.) p value 
SIZE 8.544 8.569 -0.025  2.3   (0.63)     0.526 
LEVERAGE 0.744 0.734  0.010 -5.2  (-1.43)     0.152 
ROA 0.079 0.074  0.005 -5.9  (-1.63)     0.103 
Z_SCORE 3.094 3.118 -0.024  1.3   (0.36)     0.719 
GROWTH 1.076 1.077 -0.001  0.5   (0.14)     0.885 
TANGIBLE 0.373 0.367  0.007 -2.4  (-0.67)     0.504 
      
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics and the difference in means for the matching variables. Diff 
denotes the absolute difference between control and treatment firms, %bias denotes the standardized bias 
after Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985), t stat. and p value denote the signiﬁcance of the two-sided t-tests. *, 
**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
 
 
3.4.2. Descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, and correlations 
The descriptive statistics in Table 15 (Panel A) show the full sample. Treatment and 
control firms differ significantly according to size and other firm characteristics. The 
mean (median) assets equal € 35 (€ 8) mn for the treatment group and € 9 (€ 4) mn for 
the unlimited liability control group. The treatment sample consists of small (assets below 
€ 10 mn) and medium sized firms (assets between € 10 mn and € 50 mn), while the 
unlimited liability control group firms are, on average, considerably smaller. The average 
firm is profitable, with mean return on assets (ROA) of 0.061 for treatment and 0.079 for 
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control firms, and highly leveraged, with mean leverage ratios of 0.743 for treatment and 
0.716 for control firms. 
Table 15 (Panel B) displays the matched sample. Since we match according to all 
listed observables, except for our variable of interest (FACCESS), the treatment and 
control firms are similar in size and other firm characteristics. Mean (median) assets equal 
€ 14 (€ 5) mn for the treatment group and € 11 (€ 5) mn for the control group. Both, our 
unmatched and matched sample consists of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)53. 
These firms rely most heavily on private debt, and strong information asymmetry is 
predominantly associated with small and moderately sized firms (Elsas and Krahnen 
1998; Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Therefore, our setting is especially valuable for the 
analysis of the disclosure effect on access to bank debt. 
Pearson correlations are shown in Table 16, indicating high correlation between 
Z_SCORE and ROA as well as between Z_SCORE and TANGIBLE. In unreported tests, 
we use the rolling standard deviation of net interest before extraordinary items as 
probability of default approximation (Francis et al. 2005) instead of the Z_SCORE and 
show that our results are not affected.  
 
                                                 
53 According to the European Commission, a firm which has less than 250 employees and either turnover 
of less or equal to € 50 mn or total assets of less or equal to € 43 mn is considered a SME. The European 
SME definition is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-
definition/index_en.htm, last access: 20/08/2017. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics 
   
   
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the full sample (N=48,623) 
 Treatment  Control 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th N  Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th N 
Financials              
ASSETS (€ mn) 34.908 88.722 3.484 8.295 23.902 44,083  9.069 24.995 1.720 3.523 9.474 4,540 
TURNOVER (€ mn) 41.217 87.057 5.651 13.791 35.465 44,083  13.858 22.662 1.320 5.067 15.995 4,540 
EMPLOYEE 173.401 892.342 22.000 57.000 147.000 44,083  48.877 137.320 1.000 18.000 53.000 4,540 
Dependent variable                         
FACCESS 0.590 0.303 0.344 0.634 0.857 44,083  0.764 0.285 0.617 0.887 1.000 4,540 
Control variables                         
SIZE 9.231 1.405 8.156 9.023 10.082 44,083  8.380 1.080 7.450 8.167 9.156 4,540 
LEVERAGE 0.743 0.180 0.632 0.769 0.884 44,083  0.716 0.216 0.578 0.746 0.899 4,540 
ROA 0.061 0.090 0.008 0.043 0.100 44,083  0.079 0.089 0.022 0.058 0.116 4,540 
Z_SCORE 3.123 1.740 1.907 3.050 4.174 44,083  2.963 1.879 1.452 2.816 4.073 4,540 
GROWTH 1.054 0.217 0.958 1.032 1.129 44,083  1.051 0.193 0.964 1.027 1.123 4,540 
TANGIBLE 0.315 0.267 0.092 0.244 0.476 44,083  0.437 0.281 0.203 0.407 0.659 4,540 
VOLUNTARY 0.252 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000 44,083  0.040 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 4,540 
Additional analyses                           
FMATURITY 0.476 0.362 0.051 0.516 0.815 44,083   0.476 0.384 0.000 0.510 0.855 4,540 
FCOD 0.046 0.023 0.033 0.045 0.056 44,083   0.049 0.022 0.037 0.049 0.059 4,540 
FSECURED 0.282 0.331 0.000 0.113 0.548 44,083   0.095 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000 4,540 
              
(Continued) 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
  
  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the matched sample (N=6,278) 
 Treatment  Control 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th N  Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th N 
Financials              
ASSETS (€ mn) 14.028 45.196 2.350 4.686 10.681 3,139  11.103 29.553 2.122 4.699 11.639 3,139 
TURNOVER (€ mn) 16.042 30.965 3.094 7.003 17.877 3,139  17.187 25.520 2.231 7.273 22.407 3,139 
EMPLOYEE 60.561 133.164 10.000 30.000 68.000 3,139  60.269 161.135 2.000 24.000 67.000 3,139 
Dependent variable                          
FACCESS 0.626 0.294 0.396 0.682 0.890 3,139  0.739 0.293 0.559 0.857 0.999 3,139 
Control variables                          
SIZE 8.611 1.122 7.762 8.452 9.276 3,139  8.580 1.106 7.660 8.455 9.362 3,139 
LEVERAGE 0.722 0.185 0.609 0.748 0.866 3,139  0.739 0.202 0.603 0.769 0.906 3,139 
ROA 0.069 0.090 0.013 0.050 0.110 3,139  0.080 0.089 0.023 0.060 0.117 3,139 
Z_SCORE 3.094 1.861 1.651 3.041 4.291 3,139  3.087 1.871 1.709 3.028 4.165 3,139 
GROWTH 1.055 0.214 0.961 1.025 1.117 3,139  1.053 0.194 0.963 1.030 1.127 3,139 
TANGIBLE 0.376 0.292 0.113 0.313 0.590 3,139  0.383 0.265 0.160 0.352 0.560 3,139 
VOLUNTARY 0.223 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,139  0.048 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,139 
Additional analyses                           
FMATURITY 0.492 0.367 0.059 0.538 0.843 3,139   0.446 0.375 0.000 0.440 0.816 3,139 
FCOD 0.046 0.022 0.033 0.045 0.056 3,139   0.049 0.023 0.036 0.048 0.060 3,139 
FSECURED 0.308 0.345 0.000 0.154 0.609 3,139   0.104 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,139 
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, own calculations. 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the treatment and control sample. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B shows the descriptive 
statistics for the matched sample. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
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Table 16: Correlations 
  
 
Panel A: Pearson correlations for the full sample (N=48,623) 
 FACCESS SIZE LEVERAGE ROA Z_SCORE GROWTH TANGIBLE VOLUNTARY 
FACCESS   1        
SIZE -0.0861   1       
LEVERAGE   0.3556 -0.1203   1      
ROA -0.2242 -0.0793 -0.1488   1     
Z_SCORE -0.2677 -0.2662 -0.1212   0.4667 1    
GROWTH -0.0025   0.0199   0.0579   0.2113   0.1158   1   
TANGIBLE   0.3410   0.1374 -0.0738 -0.1150 -0.5335 -0.0186   1  
VOLUNTARY -0.0461 -0.0819 -0.0128   0.0623   0.1481   0.0167 -0.1039 1 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations for the matched sample (N=6,278) 
 FACCESS SIZE LEVERAGE ROA Z_SCORE GROWTH TANGIBLE VOLUNTARY 
FACCESS  1               
SIZE -0.1525   1             
LEVERAGE -0.0009 -0.1092   1           
ROA -0.1487 -0.0393 -0.1687   1         
Z_SCORE -0.0452 -0.1551 -0.2180   0.5304    1       
GROWTH   0.0263   0.0303   0.0544   0.1529   0.0854    1     
TANGIBLE   0.1855   0.0892 -0.0041 -0.1794 -0.5740 -0.0038   1   
VOLUNTARY -0.0393   0.0397 -0.0109   0.0544   0.1530   0.0400 -0.1132  1 
 
        
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, own calculations. 
Notes: This table displays Pearson correlation coefficients. * represents significance at the 5% level or below. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All 
variables are defined in Table 13. 
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Table 17 shows the results for the univariate difference-in-difference analysis. 
One can observe that the difference-in-difference of access to bank debt is positive and 
significant for the full (Panel A) as well as the matched (Panel B) sample.  
  
Table 17: Univariate difference-in-difference analysis of access to bank debt 
  
  
Panel A: Difference in difference analysis for the full sample (N=48,623) 
    Mean diff (t stat.) p value 
       
Pre EHUG 
(2004-2006) 
Control   0.773    
Treatment   0.587    
Diff (T-C)pre   -0.186 (-27.90) 0.000*** 
        
Post EHUG 
(2007-2009) 
Control   0.754    
Treatment   0.593    
Diff (T-C)post   -0.161 (-24.35) 0.000*** 
        
 Diff-in-diff (T-C)post-(T-C)pre   0.026 (2.72) 0.006*** 
 
Panel B: Difference in difference analysis for the matched sample (N=6,278) 
    Mean diff (t stat.) p value 
       
Pre EHUG 
(2004-2006) 
Control   0.750    
Treatment   0.622    
Diff (T-C)pre   -0.128 (-12.10) 0.000*** 
        
Post EHUG 
(2007-2009) 
Control   0.728    
Treatment   0.628    
Diff (T-C)post   -0.099 (-9.53) 0.000*** 
        
 Diff-in-diff (T-C)post-(T-C)pre   0.029 (1.93) 0.054* 
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table shows the difference in means for access to bank debt (FACCESS) for the treatment 
and control sample. Diff denotes the absolute difference between control and treatment firms, t stat. and 
p value indicate the level of signiﬁcance. *, **, *** represent (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. Diff-in-diff is the incremental effect of the EHUG enforcement shock on the 
treatment firms access to bank debt compared to the control firms. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
 
 
The disclosure enforcement shock results in a highly significant 2.6% difference-
in-difference in access to bank debt (t-stat= 2.72, p-value=0.006). While control group 
firms, on average, lose access, the treated firms can close the observed gap quite visibly 
(Figure 1). The effect for the matched sample is similar (2.9%) and still significant (t-
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stat=1.93, p-value=0.054). It likewise is economically meaningful. These significant 
difference-in-differences indicate that mandatory disclosure of previously private 
accounting information has a positive effect on access to bank debt, even after matching 
firms on a range of controls which likely also determine banks’ lending decisions. 
Although our matching process is highly effective, resulting in insignificant differences 
between the treatment and control sample, we nevertheless perform the multivariate 
analyses, to control for remaining differences in firm characteristics and unobservable 
factors (captured in fixed effects). 
3.4.3. The effect of mandatory public disclosure on access to bank debt 
Table 18 reports the estimated coefficients of Eq. (19) for the full (Column 1) and the 
matched sample (Column 2). We employ firm-fixed effects in both regressions to control 
for a range of unobservable factors that are constant over time (Nikolaev and van Lent 
2005). 
For the full sample (Column 1), our coefficient estimates for the control variables 
exhibit the predicted signs. As previously expected, firm size (SIZE) and asset 
collateralizability (TANGIBLE) have a positive and significant association with access 
to bank debt (FACCESS). On the contrary, ROA and GROWTH show the expected 
negative association. The coefficient for the ambiguous controls Z_SCORE, 
LEVERAGE and VOLUNTARY are, with the exception of LEVERAGE, insignificant. 
In addition, results for the matched sample (Column 2) are generally similar. The only 
differences being that LEVERAGE loses its significant association and Z_SCORE 
undergoes a sign change, which does not draw the larger results in question given the 
ambiguous nature of the variable, as outlined before. 
The coefficients on the interaction term between POST and TREATMENT 
represents the difference-in-difference estimator for testing our hypothesis. In both 
specifications, it is significant and exhibits the expected sign. For the full sample, the 
coefficient estimate of POST*TREATMENT is significant (at the 0.05 level) and positive 
(𝛽1=0.0139). Employing the matched sample it is larger but slightly less significant. The 
decrease in significance might be the result of the smaller sample size with less underlying 
variation in terms of the dependent variable. Nonetheless, we can confirm our prior notion, 
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that once private accounting information becomes public it increases firms’ access to 
bank debt. 
 
Table 18: The effect of switching from private to public accounting information 
on access to bank debt 
   
 
  Dependent variable: FACCESS 
 Pred. 
sign 
1) Full sample   2) Matched sample 
 coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
       
POST*TREATMENT +  0.0139**  (2.53)   0.0175*  (1.76) 
       
SIZE +  0.0657***  (9.92)   0.0570***  (3.34) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.1011*** (-5.49)  -0.0456 (-0.92) 
ROA - -0.1680*** (-7.46)  -0.2620*** (-4.28) 
Z_SCORE ? -0.0020 (-0.83)   0.0120**  (2.12) 
GROWTH -  0.0018  (0.45)   0.0064  (0.58) 
TANGIBLE +  0.1584***  (8.91)   0.2012***  (4.05) 
VOLUNTARY ?  0.0048  (1.64)   0.0105  (1.01) 
       
YEAR FE  Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE  Yes   Yes  
       
Adj. R-squared  0.7989   0.7990  
Within R-squared  0.0185   0.0203  
       
N  48,623   6,278  
Firms  9,476   1,214  
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on access 
to bank debt (FACCESS). The interaction term POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-
difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics are presented 
in parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 13. 
 
 
3.5. Robustness 
3.5.1. Alternative proxy for access to bank debt 
In Table 19 we define access to bank debt as total bank debt divided by total assets 
(García-Teruel et al. 2014). The results are similar compared to the main analysis. 
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Table 19: Alternative proxy for access to bank debt 
   
 
  Dependent variable: FACCESS2 
 Pred. 
sign 
1) Full sample   2) Matched sample 
 coef.  (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
       
POST*TREATMENT +  0.0075**    (2.09)   0.0002  (0.04) 
       
SIZE +  0.0532***  (12.90)   0.0530***  (4.39) 
LEVERAGE ?  0.1665***  (16.66)   0.2021***  (6.55) 
ROA - -0.1378*** (-11.16)  -0.1355*** (-3.59) 
Z_SCORE ? -0.0003   (-0.22)   0.0017  (0.49) 
GROWTH - -0.0079***   (-3.25)  -0.0025 (-0.36) 
TANGIBLE +  0.1606***  (13.23)   0.1977***  (5.94) 
VOLUNTARY ?  0.0000    (0.00)   0.0011  (0.16) 
       
YEAR FE  Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE  Yes   Yes  
       
Adj. R-squared  0.8503   0.8533  
Within R-squared  0.0699   0.0772  
       
N  48,623   6,278  
Firms    9,476   1,214  
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on access 
to bank debt (FACCESS). The interaction term POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-
difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics are presented 
in parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 13. 
 
 
The difference-in-difference coefficient estimate for the full sample (𝛽1=0.0075, 
t-stat=2.09) has a smaller magnitude compared to the main analysis (𝛽1=0.0139, t-
stat=2.53). The EHUG enforcement leads to 0.75% more access to bank debt for 
treatment firms compared to control firms. Unfortunately, the coefficient estimate for the 
matched sample is not significant (𝛽1=0.0002, t-stat=0.04).  
3.5.2. Clustering by firm and year 
As the Hausman test suggests, we use firm fixed effects in our main analysis and 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to control for serial correlation. If we use 
clustering according to year (untabulated) or according to both (year and firm) most of 
our results remain significant (Petersen 2009). Table 20, Column 1 and 2 show the results 
 75 
 
when we cluster by year and firm. The coefficient estimate for POST * TREATMENT is 
significant at the 0.10 level for the full sample (Column 1). However, Column 2 shows 
that the coefficient estimate is barely insignificant for the matched sample (𝛽1=0.0175, t-
stat=1.57). 
 
Table 20: Clustering by year and firm 
   
 
  Dependent variable: FACCESS 
 Pred. 
sign 
1) Full sample   2) Matched sample 
 coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
       
POST*TREATMENT +  0.0139*  (2.21)   0.0175  (1.57) 
       
SIZE +  0.0657***  (8.09)   0.0570**  (3.92) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.1011*** (-5.42)  -0.0456 (-0.72) 
ROA - -0.1680*** (-4.31)  -0.262*** (-4.28) 
Z_SCORE ? -0.0020 (-0.88)   0.0120**  (2.77) 
GROWTH -  0.0018  (0.37)   0.0064  (0.42) 
TANGIBLE +  0.1584***  (8.06)   0.2012***  (4.03) 
VOLUNTARY ?  0.0048  (1.63)   0.0105  (0.84) 
       
YEAR FE  Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE  Yes   Yes  
       
Adj. R-squared  0.7989   0.799  
Within R-squared  0.0185   0.0203  
N  48,623   6,278  
Firms  9,476   1,214  
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on access 
to bank debt (FACCESS). The interaction term POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-
difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the year and firm level (t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
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3.6. Additional analyses 
3.6.1. Private and public accounting information and credit terms 
In relationship lending, private information results in less information asymmetries 
between banks and borrowers and, thus, cost savings for banks in monitoring their 
clients. 54  However, effects on borrowers could be advantageous as well as 
disadvantageous. Banks could share these benefits with their borrowers and offer them 
better credit terms or increased access to bank debt. Nevertheless, they could also exploit 
their monopoly position to capture the firm (Kano et al. 2011). After a while, the firm can 
find itself in a “hold up” situation, where the incumbent bank can initially refuse to grant 
credit to subsequently force the firm to accept worsening credit terms (Lehmann and 
Neuberger 2001). 
Along these lines, also the empirical evidence regarding the association of private 
information with credit terms is controversial. On the one hand, housebank relationships 
result in better credit terms such as more access to external finance, lower cost of debt, 
longer debt maturity, and less pledging of collateral (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Lehmann 
and Neuberger 2001; Petersen and Rajan 1994). On the other hand, there is also evidence 
to the contrary, which points towards a detrimental “lock-in” effect (Berger and Udell 
1995; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Harhoff and Körting 
1998; Lehmann and Neuberger 2001; Machauer and Weber 1998). 
Hence, in addition to analyzing the effect of the regulatory change on firms’ 
access to bank debt, we also try to establish a first look into its effects on additional price 
(i.e., interest rate) and non-price (i.e., maturity and collateral) credit terms. These analyses 
might help in gaining insights into which type of lender (i.e., inside or outside) provides 
the additional debt funding as this information is not available in our anonymized dataset. 
First, we examine maturity, proxied by the proportion of total debt that is financed long-
term (FMATURITY). Banking theory suggests that maturity and monitoring are 
supplements (Diamond 1991). While lenders accept higher risk, which results of less 
stringent monitoring and little (costly) acquisition of private information, they, in turn, 
                                                 
54 Relationship banks can monitor client cash flows directly and instantaneously, therefore relying less on 
accounting information (Loy 2014). 
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prefer shorter maturities. These allow them to obtain the loan principal sooner, or 
renegotiate interest rates more often in order to better reflect the firm’s current risk. Thus, 
we expect maturity to increase if the existing housebank provides additional funds in 
response to decreased information asymmetry in an attempt to fend off competing banks. 
The inside lender still has the advantage of additional private information and has 
monitored the firm for a long time. Hence, it would benefit from longer maturities to 
make the client an unattractive target for competing banks. If outside lenders were to 
provide the additional funds, maturities will likely decrease. They might not have much 
incentive to set up extensive and costly screening and monitoring operations besides 
analyzing publicly available financial statements. To “get the foot in the door” and create 
additional future business, they might be inclined to offer loans at or below the incumbent 
bank’s interest rate – but with lower maturities to compensate for the additional risk of 
monitoring less. Therefore, once private information becomes public, it can result in 
increasing or decreasing maturity, depending on the source of the lender. More 
specifically, the inside (outside) lender will most probably offer longer (shorter) 
maturities, and vice versa. 
Our second additional credit term is cost of debt, proxied as interest expense 
divided by interest bearing debt (FCOD). As already mentioned, new banks might offer 
more favorable interest rates to acquire additional business and subsequently try to 
establish a “hold up” situation of their own which they can exploit to subsequently 
increase interest rates (Ioannidou and Ongena 2010). On the other hand, new lenders 
might be wary of their limited information and suspect that the incumbent will most likely 
fight the hardest for the most valuable clients. Thus, the actually acquired new business 
might be subject to the “winner’s curse”. Therefore, the outside lender might rather be 
inclined to offer a higher interest rate than the incumbent receives on its loans outstanding 
(Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Thadden 2004). Thus, once private information 
becomes public, it can result in increasing or decreasing cost of debt, depending on the 
source of the lender. We expect, that the inside lender will offer lower interest rates to 
fend off the competition, whereas the outside lender will likely offer higher interest rates, 
attributable to the “winner’s curse”. 
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Third, we examine the effect of private accounting information becoming public 
on collateralization, proxied by the proportion of collateralized debt of total interest 
bearing debt (FSECURED). The pledging of collateral has its theoretical roots in the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Besanko and Thakor 1987; Boot et al. 
1991; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Similar as maturity, pledging collateral is a substitute 
for monitoring the borrower to reduce moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). The 
incumbent bank already monitors the borrower and, for that reason, has no need to 
demand additional collateral. Furthermore, adverse selection is not a main issue for the 
inside bank, since it has reduced information asymmetry with private information 
(Bharath et al. 2011). Contrary, moral hazard and adverse selection is a greater problem 
to the outside lender. It will most probably demand collateral due to absence of 
monitoring and private information. Therefore, once private information becomes public, 
it can result in increasing or decreasing collateral, depending on the source of the lender. 
We expect, that the inside lender will demand less collateral to fend off competition 
whereas the outside lender will demand more collateral to substitute for monitoring and 
reduce the adverse selection problem. 
Table 15 displays the descriptive statistics and Table 21 the difference-in-
difference estimations for the credit terms maturity, cost of debt, and collateralization, 
each for the full (Panel A) sample and the matched (Panel B) sample. In the full sample, 
the average proportion of total debt financed long-term (FMATURITY) is 47.59% 
(47.64%) for the treatment (control) firm, respectively. The average cost of debt (FCOD) 
for treatment (control) firms is 461 (491) basis points. The cost of debt is comparable to 
the public statistics of annual interest rates55 (473 basis points) during the same period, 
indicating that the firms in our sample are essentially similar to the full population. The 
average collateralized debt (FSECURED) for treatment (control) firms is 28.16% (9.45%). 
The coverage for FSECURED differs considerably between limited and unlimited 
liability firms. The latter were not obliged to hand in this information to the Deutsche 
                                                 
55 The interest rate of banks and other financial institutions to non-financial companies in Germany for short 
and long term debt is a time series from the European System of Central Banks and available at: 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/ESCB_Time_Series/eszb_
zeitreihen_node.html?openNodeId=500220, last access: 11/09/2017. 
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Bundesbank. Therefore, the database displays values for FSECURED as zero (1) if the 
firm does not have collateral pledged for any of its debt, or (2) if the data item is truly 
missing. Attributable to this data limitation, we evaluate results for FSECURED with due 
caution. For brevity, we do not discuss descriptive statistics for the matched sample, 
which are essentially comparable. 
Table 21 (Column 1) presents the difference-in-difference firm-fixed estimation 
results for maturity. The coefficient estimate of POST*TREATMENT is significantly 
positive (𝛽2=0.0250, t-stat.=2.59). Hence, when private accounting information becomes 
public, the proportion of debt financed long-term increases considerably. Following up 
on our earlier discussion, this result indicates that the treatment firms get more access to 
debt from the inside lender. Otherwise, increased access to bank debt in combination with 
shorter maturities would imply that outside lenders provide additional debt which is rather 
short-term. 
Table 21 (Column 3) exhibits the results for cost of debt for our full sample. The 
difference-in-difference estimator is only slightly positive and barely significant 
(𝛽2=0.0008, t-stat.=1.66). The coefficient is not economically meaningful, since it 
represents only 1.7% (8 basis points compared to 461 basis points) of the treatment firms’ 
average cost of debt. Based on the cost of debt results, we cannot make any inferences as 
to which type of lender provides the additional debt. 
Table 21 (Column 5) presents the difference-in-difference estimation of 
collateralization for the full sample. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference 
estimator is significantly positive (𝛽2=0.0123, t-stat=2.33). Hence, it suggests that once 
private information become public, treatment firms have to pledge additional collateral 
for 1.23% of their outstanding debts, on average. We presume that this result points 
toward outside lenders requiring collateral for additional debt funding.56 
For comparability, we also present results for the matched sample. While the 
coefficient signs are unanimously similar to their full sample counterparts’, they are 
insignificant. There is a range of possible reasons for this effect. The small sample size 
                                                 
56 Nevertheless, it might also be plausible that the inside lender demands more collateral pledging to make 
its clients less attractive for (potential) outside lenders for which less collateral would subsequently be 
available. 
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due to lost firms post-matching as well as low variability in terms of underlying firm 
characteristics goes hand-in-hand with little variance in credit terms between treated and 
control firms – especially since we also employ firm-fixed effects estimation. Finally, it 
is possible that both, inside and outside lenders give access to bank debt, which we cannot 
determine given our dataset. Therefore, negative and positive effects on credit terms 
might cancel each other out. 
In summary, the effect of increased mandatory financial statement disclosure on 
price and non-price credit terms is ambiguous and merits further research with more 
comprehensive datasets (e.g., internal datasets from large creditors). Given the results for 
the unmatched sample, we provide initial evidence that both, inside and outside lenders 
provide the additional debt funding following the disclosure shock. 
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Table 21: Additional analysis on the effect of switching from private to public accounting information on credit terms 
  
  
 Dependent variable: FMATURITY  Dependent variable: FCOD  Dependent variable: FSECURED 
 1) Full sample   2) Matched sample  3) Full sample  4) Matched sample  5) Full sample  6) Matched sample 
 coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.)  coef.   (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
                 
POST*TREATMENT  0.0250***  (2.59)   0.0056  (0.38)   0.0008*    (1.66)   0.0007  (0.81)   0.0123**  (2.33)   0.0108  (0.95) 
                  
SIZE  0.0539***  (6.43)   0.0327  (1.30)   0.0011*    (1.77)   0.0022  (1.28)   0.0293***  (3.85)   0.0036  (0.18) 
LEVERAGE  0.0053  (0.22)   0.0035 (-0.05)  -0.0031*   (-1.86)   0.0025 (-0.62)   0.0099  (0.53)   0.0450  (0.94) 
ROA  0.0590*  (1.96)  -0.0076  (0.08)  -0.0210*** (-10.03)  -0.018*** (-2.86)  -0.0702*** (-2.98)  -0.0322 (-0.48) 
Z_SCORE -0.0077** (-2.51)  -0.0120 (-1.36)   0.0001    (0.59)   0.0009  (1.18)  -0.0021 (-0.78)  -0.0003 (-0.04) 
GROWTH  0.0119**  (2.07)   0.0292*  (1.71)   0.0000   (-0.01)  -0.0012 (-1.17)  -0.0050 (-0.95)  -0.0104 (-0.68) 
TANGIBLE  0.2214***  (8.99)   0.1161*  (1.96)   0.0075***    (4.78)   0.0087*  (1.73)   0.1692***  (8.13)   0.1415***  (2.71) 
VOLUNTARY  0.0026  (0.59)   0.0027  (0.17)   0.0001    (0.31)  -0.0011 (-1.22)   0.0089**  (2.23)   0.0038  (0.28) 
                  
YEAR FE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
                  
Adj. R-squared 0.6860   0.6753   0.6904   0.7355   0.7060   0.7071  
Within R-squared 0.0083   0.0049   0.0100   0.0078   0.0059   0.0039  
                  
N 48,623   6,278   48,623   6,278   48,623   6,278  
Firms 9,476   1,214   9,476   1,214   9,476   1,214  
 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on maturity (FMATURITY), cost of debt (FCOD), and secured loans (FSECURED). 
The interaction term POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level (t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
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3.6.2. Limited liability and access to bank debt 
As previously outlined, our matched control sample consists of unlimited liability firms. 
Banks are restricted to the firm’s assets if their defaulting borrower is a limited liability 
corporation rather than an unlimited liability partnership. Therefore, the average 
corporation contains higher credit risk (e.g., Elsas and Krahnen 1998). Unsurprisingly, 
access to bank debt is distributed in favor of unlimited liability partnerships (Figure 1). 
Our main multivariate results presented in Table 18 control for these differences through 
firm-fixed effects. We exclude firms, which change their legal form. Hence, only firms 
with the same liability status over the full period remain in the sample. Therefore, liability 
status represents a prime example of a constant underlying factor. To make the 
incremental contribution of limited liability on access to bank debt more visible, we re-
estimate our main model employing industry- instead of firm-fixed effects. As such, the 
binary TREATMENT indicator is not suppressed (Table 22). 
  
Table 22: The incremental effect of limited liability 
   
 
  Dependent variable: FACCESS 
 Pred. 
sign 
1) Full sample   2) Matched sample 
 coef.   (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
       
TREATMENT ? -0.1312*** (-13.45)  -0.1337*** (-9.00) 
POST*TREATMENT +  0.0227***    (3.51)   0.0215*  (1.93) 
       
SIZE + -0.0180***   (-8.29)  -0.0304*** (-4.36) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.1471***   (-9.81)  -0.0945** (-2.50) 
ROA - -0.4391*** (-13.88)  -0.6127*** (-6.11) 
Z_SCORE ?  0.0103***    (4.36)   0.0191***  (3.03) 
GROWTH -  0.0645***    (9.48)   0.0675***  (3.81) 
TANGIBLE +  0.3260***  (23.44)   0.2845***  (7.84) 
VOLUNTARY ?  0.0443***    (8.44)   0.0269  (1.57) 
       
YEAR FE  Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE  No   No  
INDUSTRY FE  Yes   Yes  
       
R-squared  0.1529   0.2037  
Adj. R-squared  0.1518   0.1981  
(Continued) 
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Table 22 (Continued) 
 
 
N  48,623   6,278  
Firms    9,476   1,214  
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on access 
to bank debt (FACCESS), controlling for the base line effect of limited liability. The interaction term 
POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics are presented in parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
 
 
Column 1 displays the difference-in-difference estimate for the full sample 
(𝛽2=0.0227, t-stat=3.51), which is larger in magnitude and significance compared to the 
coefficient estimate from the main analysis (𝛽1=0.0139, t-stat=2.53). Indicating that 
public disclosure leads to 2.27% more access to bank debt for treatment firms. The 
coefficient estimate for the matched sample (Column 2) does not change considerably, 
neither in magnitude nor in significance. 
3.6.3. Industry and access to bank debt 
There is evidence that industry composition is also an influential determinant of SME 
financing (Hall et al. 2000). More specifically, they exhibit that industry-specific growth, 
firm size, firm age and asset structure influence capital structure decisions in their sample 
of 3,500 private UK firms. As industry-fixed effects are absorbed in our main multivariate 
results attributable to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects, we implement the regression 
design of Kausar et al. 2016. Instead of year- and firm-fixed effects, we employ firm-
fixed effects in combination with the interaction between industry- and year-fixed effects. 
This way we control for industry while still benefitting from the stricter firm-fixed effects 
estimation. Yet, our results are comparable to the main analysis (Table 18). 
The coefficient estimate for POST*TREATMENT for the full (matched) sample 
equals 0.0136 (0.0171) and is significant at the 0.05 (0.10) level. 
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Table 23: Control for industry in the firm-fixed estimation 
   
 
  Dependent variable: FACCESS 
 Pred. 
sign 
1) Full sample   2) Matched sample 
 coef. (t stat.)  coef. (t stat.) 
       
POST*TREATMENT +  0.0136**  (2.40)   0.0171*  (1.71) 
       
SIZE +  0.0619***  (9.06)   0.0606***  (3.36) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.0983*** (-5.29)  -0.0550 (-1.10) 
ROA - -0.1662*** (-7.27)  -0.2781*** (-4.47) 
Z_SCORE ? -0.0023 (-0.95)   0.0129**  (2.17) 
GROWTH -  0.0023  (0.55)   0.0031  (0.28) 
TANGIBLE +  0.1580***  (8.89)   0.2068***  (4.03) 
VOLUNTARY ?  0.0038  (1.28)   0.0085  (0.80) 
       
YEAR*INDUSTRY FE  Yes   Yes  
FIRM FE  Yes   Yes  
       
Adj. R-squared  0.7994   0.7973  
Within R-squared  0.0170   0.0212  
       
N  48,615   6,278  
Firms    9,475   1,214  
       
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, USTAN, 2004-2009, 
own calculations. 
Notes: This table reports results from regressing POST*TREATMENT and control variables on access 
to bank debt (FACCESS), controlling for industry-fixed effects. The interaction term 
POST*TREATMENT represents the difference-in-difference estimator. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm-level (t-statistics are presented in parentheses). *, **, *** represent (two-sided) 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 13. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
This study shows that if private accounting information becomes public, it leads to 
significantly increased access to bank debt for private firms. The results hold using firm-
fixed effects estimation as well as matching on other firm characteristics, potentially 
associated with access to bank debt in a continental European bank-based economy 
(García-Teruel et al., 2014).  
Our results are important for practitioners, since they show that mandatory 
financial statement disclosure does not only accrue proprietary cost (Bernard et al. 2015; 
Wittmann and Bravidor 2015), but also measurable benefits in the form of additional 
access to capital from banks. Second, we contribute to the literature with a natural 
experimental setting which decreases self-selection concerns with respect to discretionary 
accounting disclosure choices in prior private firm lending literature (Cassar 2011; Cassar 
et al. 2015; Minnis 2011). Furthermore, this setting allows us to better separate the effects 
of accounting information and private information on information asymmetry in debt 
contracting (Danos et al. 1989). Finally, analytical research shows that more information 
sharing decreases the formation of close bank relationships, in the long-term (Gehrig and 
Stenbacka 2007). Our results exhibit the short-term effects of an exogenous information 
shock on firms’ banking. Therefore, it will be interesting for future research to follow-up 
on its long-term implications. 
The main limitation of our study is that our treatment and control sample consists 
of firms with different legal forms. We match according to firm characteristics relevant 
to lenders (size, leverage, profitability, growth, probability of default, sales growth and 
asset collateralizability), but we cannot match according to the legal form. It is possible, 
that unlimited liability firms have a different business model and therefore other 
investment opportunities. However, sales growth should proxy for investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, entrepreneurs choose the legal form that matches the 
riskiness of their investments.57 While debt provided to unlimited liability firms might be 
less risky, as the lender can also access assets in the entrepreneur’s private realm, 
                                                 
57 There is mixed evidence on the nexus between firm risk, legal liability and private firm debt financing. 
While Harhoff et al. (1998) suggest that limited liability firms are more risky and likely to default, Cassar 
(2004) deems that „limited liability gain is fictional in actuality“ (p. 268). 
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potentially riskier firm assets might impair that effect. Having said that, we control for 
probability of default, making the distinction between limited and unlimited liability and 
its effect on bank financing even less of a concern. Finally, there is evidence that the 
introduction of the Basel II banking regulations, which overlap with our post-regulation 
period, has adverse effects on private firm lending (Schindele and Szczesny 2016). Yet, 
matching according to industry-year should control for business model and business 
cycle, respectively. Moreover, since we observe a decrease in access to bank debt of the 
control group (Figure 1), Basel II likely dampens our results. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
This thesis analyzes the role of accounting information in debt contracting of German 
private firms. It includes empirical studies, which use unique combinations of datasets 
leading to important results and future research recommendations. 
The study in Chapter 2 investigates the effect of accruals quality on German 
private firms’ cost of debt and how relationship lending influences this effect.  
The study benefits from an exclusive match 58  of two Deutsche Bundesbank 
datasets: (1) USTAN (firms’ annual financial statement data) and (2) MiMiK (credit 
register of large loans). Using the USTAN database, we measure accruals quality 
according to the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model by McNichols (2002). 
Furthermore, we measure cost of debt as interest expense divided by average financial 
debt (Bigus et al. 2009; Francis et al. 2005). In addition, we approximate relationship 
lending using the MiMiK database. In this regard, the strength of the lending relationship 
is defined as the loan provided by the main lender divided by firms’ total financial loans 
and the relationship duration is measured by the consecutive years in which the firm has 
the same main lender. To estimate the moderating effect of relationship lending on the 
association between accruals quality and cost of debt, we use panel regression techniques. 
Our results exhibit that banks use accounting based lending in pricing debt of 
German small and medium private firms. Firms’ with better accruals quality face lower 
cost of debt, even after controlling for all relevant firm characteristics. However, the 
intensity of this effect depends on relationship lending. First, the larger the debt a firm 
borrows from the main lender the smaller is the effect of accruals quality. This means 
stronger relationships moderate the effect of accruals quality, since banks use a 
supplementary private information channel. Second, we find that longer relationships 
with the main bank intensify the effect of accruals quality on cost of debt. Due to 
multiplied interaction, the bank learns to better interpret accounting information. 
                                                 
58 The match was established by Stefan Goldbach, for detail description see Goldbach and Nitsch (2014). 
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In particular, the results show that firms with high59 accruals quality get 32.96 
basis points lower cost of debt than firms with low accruals quality, which represents 
6.67% of the sample’s average cost of debt. Yet, the cost of debt benefits from accruals 
quality differ significantly if we take into account relationship strength and relationship 
duration. We find that with low relationship strength, a high accruals quality firm gets 
56.85 basis points lower cost of debt compared to a low accruals quality firm. However, 
the cost of debt benefit of accruals quality decreases to 18.32 basis points when the firm 
has a high relationship strength with its main bank. The reason for this result might be 
that if banks have strong relationships, they are the exclusive lender and thus motivated 
to monitor the firm more closely and acquire private information (Diamond 1984). 
Therefore, the bank builds less on accounting information and more on the costly gathered 
private information. Furthermore, we find that higher relationship duration enhances the 
cost of debt benefit from accruals quality. Our results show that firms with a low 
relationship duration get only 13.28 basis points cost of debt benefit from accruals quality, 
whereas firms with a high relationship duration get 57.12 basis points. Thus, as the 
relationship goes on, the bank generates a data history and can better interpret accruals 
quality.  
In summary, these results show that accounting information plays a significant 
role for German small and medium private firms. In addition, we find that accounting and 
private information complement as well as substitute each other. Thus, it is hard to 
disentangle the influence of accounting information for existing borrowers (Danos et al. 
1989). Therefore, the study in Chapter 3 examines the influence of accounting 
information for new borrowers in a quasi-natural experimental setting. 
The study in Chapter 3 analyzes the consequences of a public disclosure law 
enforcement on German private firms’ access to bank debt. 
This study employs a unique match 60  of the Deutsche Bundesbank dataset 
USTAN and the commercial dataset Amadeus of the Bureau van Dijk. This data 
                                                 
59 For the ease of interpretation, we calculate all economic effects on cost of debt comparing a high accruals 
quality (relationship strength, relationship duration) firm (value of 90th percentile) with a low accruals 
quality (relationship strength, relationship duration) firm (value of 10th percentile). 
60 The match was established by Schild et al. (2017). 
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combination allows investigating the effects of a law enforcement (i.e., an external shock) 
on private firms’ access to bank debt. The former dataset includes firms that share their 
financial statements with a small round of stakeholders (e.g. housebank) and in addition 
had to submit these statements to the Deutsche Bundesbank for refinancing purposes 
(Stöss 2001). Thus, USTAN consists of firms with and without the obligation to publish 
financial statements. The latter dataset includes financial statements, which are publicly 
available in the electronic federal gazette (i.e., mandatory publicized financial statements 
and voluntary publications). Hence, this study is one of the first to use such a match of 
datasets enabling the analyses of a quasi-natural experiment. 
The publication of financial statements is strongly regulated since the introduction 
of the EHUG (Act on Electronic Commercial Registers, Registers of Cooperatives and 
Business Registers) in 1/1/2007. Firms are forced to pay monetary penalties if not 
publicizing their financial statements (beginning with 2006) in the electronic federal 
gazette. Before 2006, there was no de facto enforcement of private firm financial 
statement disclosure in Germany. After 2006, almost all firms publish according to the 
EHUG requirements. Since the publication requirements differ between limited liability 
firms and unlimited liability firms, we can clearly differentiate between treatment and 
control firms. Furthermore, we are able to control for firms, which voluntarily publicized 
their financial statements before the EHUG. Therefore, this setting allows us to set up a 
difference-in-difference analysis. 
Hence, before the regulatory shock financial accounting information on private 
firms had been largely private. The firm only shared it with a small number of handpicked 
stakeholders, including its lenders. Therefore, those inside lenders had a considerable 
information advantage over competing banks, attributable to private financial accounting 
information as well as the accumulation of additional private information. However, after 
the EHUG regulatory enforcement, private accounting information becomes public for 
treatment firms. Our results show, that this fact results in additional access to bank debt 
for treatment firms. Accordingly, we find that mandatory public disclosure leads to 1.4% 
more access to bank debt for treatment firms compared to control firms. This means on 
average 138,723.23€ more access to bank debt, which is economically meaningful, since 
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our sample consists of small and medium sized firms. This might either be the result of 
the inside lender expanding its engagement to fend off new lenders, or new lenders 
granting loans as their information asymmetry compared to the inside lenders decreases. 
The results hold in a difference-in-difference regression design with year and firm 
fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at firm level. To further approach 
causality, we employ a matching procedure between private limited liability firms, subject 
to financial statement disclosure, and small and medium sized private unlimited liability 
firms. Only very large unlimited liability companies are subject to the financial 
accounting disclosure rules. Our results show again, that mandatory financial statement 
disclosure enables limited liability firms to close significantly the financing gap to their 
unlimited liability counterparts.  
In an additional analysis, we also attempt to show how this decreased information 
asymmetry affects price (cost of debt) and non-price (maturity and collateralization) 
credit terms. If the inside lender increases the loan amounts to fend off additional (outside) 
lenders, the credit terms would, in all likelihood, improve. The existing bank relationship 
has been costly to establish, as (ex ante-) screening and (ex post-) monitoring the client 
involve considerable bank resources. As established bank relationships therefore signal 
creditworthiness to (potential) outside lenders, these might offer additional loans to the 
client at similar rates without additional effort to acquire private information. Hence, if 
inside lenders grant additional loans, we would expect maturity to increase, cost of debt 
to decrease and the proportion of collateralized loans to decrease to keep the firm in an 
exclusive bank relationship. Whereas, it is also possible that if outside lenders with little 
to no additional private information were to provide the additional funds, we would not 
necessarily expect (much) improvement in credit terms. On the one hand, the new bank 
might offer more favorable credit terms to “get the foot in the door”. Subsequently it 
could try to establish its own “hold up” (Ioannidou and Ongena 2010). On the other hand, 
the new lenders might be wary of their limited information and try to charge higher 
interest rates, require higher collateralization, and offer lower maturities to account for a 
potential “winner’s curse” (Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Thadden 2004). Our results 
show that while maturity increases (improvement in credit terms), cost of debt increases 
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slightly as well as does the proportion of collateralized loans (worsening in credit terms). 
Therefore, the effect of additional public disclosure on credit terms, and the likely 
provider of the additional bank loans (inside vs. outside lenders) remains ambiguous and 
merits further research. 
Further research could use credit data to examine, if inside or outside lenders grant 
additional loans to the firm. Possible datasets for this analysis are more detailed credit 
data of private banks or the MiMiK of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Furthermore, using the 
MiMiK, the next possible research direction could be the influence of the EHUG 
enforcement on relationship lending. The answer to the question “Does mandatory 
publication lead to more lenders for private firms?” could clarify previous ambiguous 
results. Another possible direction for future research is to analyze if the extent of 
mandatory publication has an influence on firms’ debt financing. After the EHUG 
enforcement, all corporations have to publicize their financial statements in the online 
federal gazette. However, the German Commercial Code (Section 326 and 327), reliefs 
small and medium firms regarding the extent of mandatory publication. It would be 
interesting to elaborate if medium firms who publicize their balance sheet and profit and 
loss statement have more access to bank debt than small firms who publicize only their 
balance sheet. 
To conclude, this thesis contributes to the understanding of how accounting 
information influences debt contracting of German private firms. However, there is still 
potential for future research in using more detailed credit data to give further insights 
especially regarding the influence of accounting information on relationship lending. 
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